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This thesis assesses drug-treatment quality in the three Afghan provinces of Kabul, 
Kandahar, and Badakhshan by evaluating the extent to which UNODC and WHO 
standards of care are met. The assessment is structured to show how recovery capital, 
institutional development, and community action sway an addict’s ability to quit drugs 
successfully. In contextualizing the case studies, a social-economic and political 
framework is also developed, finding a linkage between addiction, poverty, and drug 
trafficking. The most successful drug treatment programs follow the nine UNODC/WHO 
components, enrich community networks, invest in developing human capital, and adapt 
treatment protocols quickly to Afghanistan’s unique circumstances. Provinces with 
vibrant markets are even more effective at providing quality drug treatment because they 
are more socially invested in their community. In conclusion, this thesis recommends that 
we consider the social implications—such as poverty, economics, mental health, and 
education—when tackling corruption and countering narcotics. Social programs cannot 
exist in a weak governance system that propels violence. Counseling addicts and 
improving poverty rates will improve trust between partnerships, instill a sense of 
empowerment within the poor, create an outlet for social change, and incentivize the 
community to move away from the illicit drug market. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores a major element of the drug economy in Afghanistan, 
focusing on how individual addiction treatment efforts interact with the broader social 
and political context. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), “almost one million Afghans, roughly 8% of the population between 15 and 
64 years old,” are addicted to opium, heroin, cannabis, or painkillers.1 The percentage of 
Afghans that are drug dependent is above the global average (3.3% to 6.1%) and data 
suggests that it will continue to increase as violence spreads.2 Most concerning is the use 
of opium; it is sold “extraordinarily pure here and very cheap—about $3.50 for enough to 
get high,” because it is so abundant.3 UNODC reports propose that there is a linkage 
between drug trafficking, poverty, and addiction. In a sense, it is a vicious circle4; the 
impoverished in Afghanistan are more likely recruited to grow poppy or to transfer drugs 
illegally across borders, because they are more vulnerable. They become trapped when 
they are addicted and have to buy large quantities of opium to get their fix. Poor 
individuals will engage in risky behaviors, like the drug trade, if it means a chance at a 
better standard of living. Lower-income individuals additionally have more challenges to 
overcome, because they lack sufficient funding for counseling or medication, they are 
less informed about community resources, and are more likely to be depressed.5 These 
individuals then are stuck in the drug industry, because it is the only means to provide for 
their drug habit. Drug treatment programs that target basic needs of impoverished people 
                                                 
1 UNODC, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey (United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 2009), 1. 
2 Sandeep Chawla, The World Drug Report 2011 (New York: United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime, 2011), 13.  
3 Alissa Rubin, “Few Treatment Options for Afghans as Drug Use Rises,” New York Times, August 
27, 2011, 1. 
4 Thomas Schweich, U.S. Counter Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, 2007), 
15.  
5 Catherine Todd, “A Cross-Sectional Assessment of Utilization of Addiction Treatment among 
Injection Drug Users in Kabul, Afghanistan,” Substance Use & Misuse (2009): 416. 
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will reduce the demand for illegal substances in Afghanistan, which can in turn, decrease 
the desire and incentive to participate in the drug trade.  
This thesis builds upon this argument that drug related violence and inequality 
stem from illicit transport. It does so, in particular, by examining the existing literature on 
the relationship between drug economies and civil conflict and insecurity in order to 
examine the potential for success in Afghan drug treatment programs. This latter 
literature typically places more attention on the socio-economic context surrounding 
individuals and assesses both drug producers and drug consumers to fully grasp how 
supply and demand can be suppressed without generating society-wide consequences.6 
For example, where there are no jobs for individuals leaving the drug market, new 
businesses and community programs must be expanded to ensure alternative options are 
available. It is important to include socio-economic issues to fully comprehend the 
substance abuse dilemma and its impact on the future of Afghanistan’s stability. These 
issues must be incorporated to guarantee the viability of drug treatment programs.  
The core hypothesis of this thesis is that drug treatment centers linked to vibrant 
markets with legitimate economic opportunities make it more likely that an Afghan drug 
addict will recover without relapse. These markets will enrich community networks, and 
provide new employment alternatives. At the same time, socio-economic systems which 
are mostly organized by international and local aid agencies should be developed 
simultaneously with U.S.-led and UN-led counter-narcotic strategies to ensure treaties are 
enforced and Afghanistan is secure.7 In short, drug treatment programs have a small 
chance of being effective if they exist within a weak governance system that propels 
violence. In turn, the livelihood of the Afghan population is dependent on how the 
country provides economic opportunities for its poor as well as how it reduces addiction 
rates within its community. This type of development will be difficult if there is little 
incentive for the poor to move away from the drug market.  
                                                 
6 LaMond Tullis, Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic- Socioeconomic and Political 
Consequences (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2011), 47.  
7 Scott MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris. International Handbook on Drug Control (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1992), 430. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
Drug treatment should be prioritized in Afghanistan because it is interlinked with 
all the key variables that prevent the nation from becoming more stable: its insecure 
environment, its insurgent groups, and its role in drug production. There is a general 
consensus among Afghan experts that both the international community and the 
government of Afghanistan have failed to assist drug abusers and stop trafficking.8 The 
poor are being punished for their involvement with opium, even though it is their way of 
survival, while the Taliban and warlords are economically benefiting from the 
international community’s strategies to diminish trafficking. In 2009, it was estimated 
that 53% percent of Afghans were living in poverty and 40% of them were unemployed.9 
Poor individuals are more vulnerable to drug addiction, which, in turn, exacerbates their 
poverty and makes them reliant on a government that is unable to provide for them. For 
example, the typical drug user in Afghanistan is a married man with children; he is likely 
to be unemployed and/or uneducated and willing to “supplement his income, presumably 
to meet the cost of his drug use… by either selling his assets, borrowing money, stealing, 
begging, or committing other crimes.”10 The large percentage of addicts, who prioritize 
highly potent and addictive drugs over basic living expenditures, has widened the 
national poverty gap and has perpetuated dependency on social welfare systems.11 
Addictions can cause unique challenges for a state social welfare system because 
widespread drug abuse often leads to an increase in poverty, mental and physical 
disabilities and criminal behavior. Welfare programs initiated by central government are 
unable to deliver resources (due to corruption and insecurity), which intensifies 
uncertainty that oftentimes leads to violence. According to Robert Watkins, “there are 40 
drug treatment centers in Afghanistan, but treatment remains inaccessible to one-third of 
                                                 
8 Open Source Center, “Selection List: Afghanistan Press 27 Aug 11,” last modified August 27, 2011, 
http:www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/S
AP20110827950026 
9 Todd, “A Cross-Sectional Assessment,” 419. 
10 UNODC, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, 9. 
11 UNODC, “Drug Demand Reduction and HIV/AIDS,” last modified 2011, 
http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/drug-demand-reduction-and-hiv-aids.html 
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the country.”12 Social services need to be enhanced so that Afghans can become more 
stable and economically self-sufficient. A more community-enhanced social welfare 
system would make the mental health, economic, and political/governance sector more 
credible. Having quality drug treatment programs in countries involved in the drug trade, 
would ensure individuals have resources to manage psychological scars from conflict. 
Enhancing education, unemployment, and addiction programs can be beneficial in fragile 
societies because it gives the impoverished more opportunities and lessens the discontent 
and animosity between social classes and ethnic groups. 
An additional problem identified by Afghanistan health experts is concern over 
blood-borne diseases. Alarmingly, a recent study “found [Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV)] present in about 7 percent of drug users, double the figure just three years 
ago.”13 Even more concerning, Afghan children of all ages are struggling with substance 
abuse issues. It is common for mothers to give their child opium or painkillers as a means 
for comfort.14 This high rate of HIV patients and children addicts along with misuse of 
pharmaceuticals shows that there is a lack of educational awareness in regards to drug 
use. Preventative programs could reduce addiction rates and health outbreaks for the next 
generation, and are less costly for the central government to implement nationwide. 
In short, drug trafficking is an international security concern because it 
undermines legitimate economic and social governance, which can in turn lead to distrust 
in government along with increasing economic and physical insecurity for individuals. 
This subsequently creates an optimal environment for insurgent groups to operate within. 
Many fear that drug profits will end up in the hands of terrorist groups who will attack 
principle consuming countries, such as the United States. The majority of Afghanistan’s 
drug-related problems lie in how its economic markets are structured: drug trafficking 
systems ensure that the majority of funds go to warlords and militias which attempt to 
weaken institutions, reduce economic diversification, widen the gap between rich and 
                                                 
12 CNN Wire Staff, “Report: Afghan drug addiction twice global average,” CNN World News. June 
23, 2010, 1. 
13 Rubin, “Few Treatment Options for Afghans as Drug Use Rises,” 1. 
14 UNODC, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, 3. 
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poor, and may perpetuate overall violence. Even though there are high risks associated 
with drug trafficking, the poor often chose to participate because the financial returns are 
so significant and, particularly in the absence of other economic alternatives, can ensure 
survival of family members. 
Addiction in Afghanistan is heavily stigmatized by citizens and seen as a poor 
person’s problem. Drug treatment, in conjunction with developmental programs, offers 
the best opportunities for Afghanistan’s poor to overcome addition and re-enter 
productive economic roles. Market development and new occupations which are not 
related to opium, should lead to a decrease in addiction. This research does not suggest 
that the international community should limit attention to governance and security; 
although both these components are crucial to rebuilding the country and to managing the 
global drug trade. Instead, this research recommends that we also consider the social 
implications—such as poverty, health, economics, and education—when creating 
programs to manage corruption and trafficking. Counseling addicts will help reduce the 
chance of continued conflict, instill a sense of empowerment within the poor, and create a 
framework for socio-economic change. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
This thesis examines the role of drug treatment programs in Afghanistan and 
pinpoints services available to help potential and current drug users in three regions. 
Additionally, it assesses sustainability by evaluating how social and economic programs 
can be used as a tool to strengthen the community, so that addicts have a more stable 
environment to return to once finished with treatment. This research suggests that drug 
rehabilitation is not just an individual process but a societal one as well. To fully 
understand an addict’s dilemma when quitting, environmental and social causal 
factors—such as having friends and family members who use drugs, managing physical 
cravings, getting income from drug market, and suffering from psychological trauma 
from war— will need to be addressed.  
The core hypothesis is that treatment programs will be more effective when they 
emphasize awareness and prevention, understand cultural constraints, manage 
 6 
environmental factors, and have extensive community resources. In addition, states or 
regions with stronger economic markets will have less difficulty with drug addiction, 
because there will be more welfare services available to help the poor. Regions that 
prioritize social programs will overtime have more advanced technologies, which should 
connect them to national organizations that will push for more cutting edge services and 
interventions. As a result, they will have more specialized staff because these drug 
treatment programs will be able to afford higher wages and offer an educational 
experience that new professionals will aspire to. The counter-hypothesis would suggest 
that economic markets have no impact on treatment centers and that success is dependent 
on the individual’s motivation to quit. This alternative would then recommend more 
attention towards the effectiveness of counseling procedures rather than the community 
role in drug addiction programs.   
Regions in Afghanistan that are more successful at treating addiction will have 
community awareness programs, training courses, an understanding of relapse triggers, 
less environmental challenges, and recovery capital. Recovery capital can be defined as, 
“the amount of personal and social resources an individual has available to provide 
strength and support in the process of recovery of addiction.”15 Understanding relapse 
prevention methods is important because it unites local community networks in working 
together to ensure that addicts have resources once they leave rehabilitation facilities. In 
short, it is expected that drug treatment success will be determined not only by the quality 
of the drug treatment centers but by Afghanistan’s ability to create mental health 
programs and vocational training as well as reduce corruption. Regardless of the clinic, 
addicts are likely to relapse if they return to a community which lacks welfare programs 
and sponsors to guide them back to a healthy lifestyle. The most effective treatment 
centers will network within the community and react quickly to environmental 
circumstances such as being near drug trafficking routes and/or managing victims who 
suffer from psychological symptoms of war. 
                                                 
15 Alexandre B. Laudet, “The Road to Recovery: Where are we going and how do we get there? 
Empirically-driven conclusions and future directions for service development and research,” Substance Use 
Misuse 43, no. 12–13 (2008): 2012.  
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There is not much research available relating the effectiveness of drug treatment 
centers to such socio-economic variables. Mostly, political scientists and economists have 
focused on how illicit substances, such as opium, influence the international community 
via trafficking, arguing that eliminating drug trafficking, processing, and cultivation 
reduces corruption, improves governance, and allows for greater security.16 These 
strategies have improved Afghanistan’s security and economic livelihoods for its 
population, but social welfare programs have not evolved to ensure continued 
effectiveness. This thesis demonstrates that welfare services, such as drug clinics, mental 
health counseling, and local economic reintegration employment programs will create 
more sustainable drug treatment success. Emphasizing economic livelihoods while 
improving poverty and mental health rates will allow Afghanistan to progress in its 
economic and political endeavors as well as potentially reduce the impact of its insurgent 
groups, which would prove to be beneficial for individuals, the government, and the 
international community.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To determine the effectiveness of drug treatment programs, the quality of 
individual/psychological interventions as well as structural/institutional capacity must be 
measured. The UNODC and the World Health Organization (WHO) have developed nine 
international components that they deem necessary when implementing community drug 
treatment programs worldwide. They are:   
1. Availability and accessibility of drug dependence treatment  
2. Screening, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment planning  
3. Evidence-informed drug dependence treatment  
4. Drug dependence treatment, human rights, and patient dignity  
5. Targeting special subgroups and conditions  
6. Addiction treatment and the criminal justice system 
7. Community involvement, participation, and patient orientation  
                                                 
16 Jeffrey Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source Country Drug 
Control Policies,” Journal of Law and Economics 51, no. 3 (2008): 407–432; Vanda Felbab-Brown. 
Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 
2010; Tullis, Handbook of Research, 60. 
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8. Clinical governance of drug dependence treatment services  
9. Treatment systems: policy development, strategic planning, and 
coordination of services17  
The recommendations are unique, because they were designed to address typical 
institutional barriers in developing countries. While these nine components are the ideal 
mechanism to examine individual needs, resource capacity, and recovery capital within 
the drug treatment program, they fail to include broader concepts from post conflict 
countries—such as violence stemming from insurgency, cultural cues, and proximity to 
the drug trade—that can also hinder development. To grasp the full context, the nine 
UNODC/WHO components along with the evaluation framework built in the literature 
review below (Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4) will be combined to identify the degree to 
which political and economic barriers affect each region.  
This thesis applies this framework to assess three provinces (Kabul, Kandahar, 
and Badakhshan) with varying constraints to show how community resources sway an 
addict’s ability to quit drugs successfully. The goal is to understand how civil institutions 
collaborate and provide insights into ways communities can play an active role. Social 
factors such as poverty, unemployment, mental illness, health, education, drug 
trafficking, and poppy production will be gauged to grasp the influence that socio-
economic systems have on effective treatment programs. Community capabilities will be 
determined by consistency of procedures: in other words, the more of the nine principles 
a treatment program follows, the more likely there is high quality intervention. This 
thesis suggests that the most successful provinces will be those which follow the nine 
UNODC/WHO principles, have strong community networks, and adapt quickly to 
Afghanistan’s unique circumstances. Furthermore, this research recommends creating a 
more tailored plan for patients to manage conflict and environmental factors.  
Each case study will be evaluated to better understand how security, and policy 
context plays a role in building effective drug treatment programs. The thesis delivers a 
comparative assessment of drug treatment quality in each of the three provinces, and 
                                                 




contextualizes and explains these outcomes with an analysis of social, economic, and 
psychological factors in each. There are a number of provinces this thesis could examine; 
however the selection was limited to enable analytical consistency, more in-depth 
research, and accurate description of the environmental and cultural factors present in 
Afghanistan. Table 1 gives estimates of the number of illicit drug users in each of the 
country’s geographic regions. Although the exact number of addicts is difficult to 
determine, the data illustrate that drug use is persistent and rampant in all provinces. 
Since each district is somewhat similar in the prevalence of addiction rates, there were 
few constraints in selecting case studies. Regions were selected by the number of drug 
users, population rates, their influence in the drug industry, and most importantly, the 
ability to access data from their drug treatment programs.  
Table 1.   Number of Illicit Drug Users and Annual Prevalence by Region18 
 Number Prevalence (%) 
Estimate Low High Estimate Low High 
Central 253,000 217,000 288,000 6.5 5.6 7.4 
Eastern 87,000 67,000 107,000 6.3 4.8 7.8 
North Eastern 82,000 69,000 95,000 6.1 5.1 7.1 
Western 101,000 88,000 114,000 5.9 5.1 6.7 
Southern 107,000 86,000 128,000 7.2 5.8 8.6 
Northern 171,000 137,000 204,000 7.2 5.8 8.7 
Afghanistan 800,000 660,000 940,000 6.6 5.4 7.7 
 
The three case studies that were selected are: Kabul in the center of the country, 
Kandahar in the south, and Badakhshan in the north. They all have unique socio-
economic environments, high addiction rates, and have been researched by multiple 
counter-narcotic experts. When analyzing the nine components in each province, special 
attention will go towards the quality of intervention, the role of the community, and the 
influence of drug treatment policy at the national level. As far as outcomes, Kabul is 
expected to have the highest recovery capital score and quality of interventions, because 
it is the capital of Afghanistan, it is linked to vibrant markets, and has the largest 
                                                 
18 National Estimates are rounded to the nearest 10,000 users; UNODC, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 
2009 Survey, 6. 
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percentage of policy makers and academics. If the hypothesis is correct, the other two 
provinces will be significantly weaker because they are both heavily involved in the drug 
industry, have more rural regions, and have less economic prospects for residents. 
Badakhshan may be slightly more advanced in its quality of interventions, because it has 
lower addiction rates and is a relatively stable region in terms of security. Kandahar is 
expected to be the weakest in terms of recovery capital, because of its instability and 
strong ties with the Taliban. 
The findings from this thesis should assist in explaining the interaction between 
drug treatment programs and broader socio-economic context in post-conflict countries. 
Moreover, the analytical framework employed can be used as a template for more 
complex addiction-prone regions. The nine UNODC/WHO principles serve not only as a 
quantitative tool to measure effectiveness, but also as reference points to ensure a more 
localized approach is developed while maintaining international uniformity. If treatment 
programs are ineffective yet adhere to standard procedures, this reflects the need to 
change counseling techniques or social programs to ensure that cultural or environmental 
concerns are addressed. The variation in terms of socio-economic indicators will allow 
for an evaluation of how much these factors affect the potential for success of drug 
treatment programs, the core question with which this thesis is concerned. 
 11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 2003, 85% of Afghanistan’s approximately 26 million inhabitants depended on 
agriculture to make a living.19 In 2009, the UNODC estimated that “245,200 households 
engaged in illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. That is 1.6 million people, 
equating to 6.4% of the total population of Afghanistan.”20 When you consider that 
poppy accounts for 46 percent of its gross domestic product, it is easy to understand why 
proposing new alternatives for development in Afghanistan remains challenging.21 
Afghanistan is unique because it has an extensive history producing drugs. International 
experts have experimented with new strategies in development, but programs have been 
ineffective because Afghanistan lacks the capacity to manage its own institutions, 
struggles to diversify its agricultural products, and fails to provide a sufficient social 
safety net for the underprivileged—especially those who are struggling with drug 
addiction.  
The objective of this literature review is to analyze existing scholarship on how 
addiction rates are connected to the drug trade. The literature review yields four 
hypotheses as to why drug treatment has not been effective thus far: (1) drug trafficking 
weakens socio-economic and political infrastructure, (2) weak economic markets deter 
community involvement and opportunity, (3) poor governance permits corruption which 
reduces the prioritization of social programs, and (4) psychological interventions are 
limited in knowledge and expertise. Together these hypotheses infer that the quality of 
provincial drug treatment programs and their ability to adhere to the nine UNODC/WHO 
good practice components will be dependent on how they manage structural/institutional 
constraints (at the provincial and national level) as well as psychological interventions (at 
the individual level). Lastly, the literature review will create a comparative framework to 
 
                                                 
19 U.S. GAO, “Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery 
Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability,” Report to Congressional Requestors (Washington, DC, 2003), 6.  
20 UNODC, Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan:Time Frame: June 2010 – July 2012 (UNODC, 
2010), 1. 
21 Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 407. 
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analyze these various components, showing how hypotheses are interconnected and 
illustrating that efforts must be addressed in tandem for successful outcomes in reducing 
drug dependence.  
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING—WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THUS 
FAR? 
There are three main schools of thoughts regarding the best ways to mitigate 
threats associated with opium consumption. These different strategies are important to 
evaluate, because they explain why past counter-narcotic policies have weakened 
institutions in Afghan’s civil society. The first method is the supply-side strategy; its 
main objective is to reduce production of drugs by targeting areas of origin, where 
narcotics are cultivated, processed, and trafficked. This is accomplished through forced 
eradication of illicit crops, creating alternative developmental programs, or interdiction 
and seizure operations.22 Once supplies are limited, there will be an increase in opium 
costs, which will deter drug use internationally.23 From this perspective, enforcement is 
the only way to permanently fix the social, economic, legal, and health constraints 
associated with the drug trade.24 Supply-side supporters see corruption as the prime 
problem in Afghanistan. Moreover, they perceive the demand-side as dangerous when 
done half-heartedly; if development fails, which it has in the past, it could make Afghans 
further aligned with the Taliban. 25   
The second option is the demand-side strategy which alternatively recommends 
decreasing the social demand for drugs. This can be implemented by providing 
                                                 
22 Scott R. Whittenburg, “Opium in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from the Counterdrug Strategies of 
Columbia” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 12. 
23 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Under covering the Politics of the Poppy (London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co., 2009), 143.  
24 Prior to 2009, most of donor funds went to supply-side approach. According to the GAO report, 
992.2 million went towards eradication, 966.3 million went towards interdiction, 382.5 million went 
towards rule of law/justice, 35.4 million went towards public information, 17.6 million went towards drug 
demand, and 110.9 million went towards program development and support from 2005–2009. Only 0.7% 
of U.S. funding for counter-narcotics went towards drug demand reduction; U.S. GAO, “Afghanistan Drug 
Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation Justice 
Reform Efforts Needed,” Report to Congressional Addressees (Washington, DC, 2010), 4–5.  
25 Ethan Nadelmann, “Drugs,” Foreign Policy, no. 162 (2007): 30. 
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preventative public awareness campaigns and drug treatment programs to combat 
addiction.26 Demand-side proponents propose that combatting addiction is much 
cheaper,27 minimizes corruption,28 is less complex for the international community, 
requires fewer resources, creates jobs, and diversifies markets so addicts do not have to 
be involved in the drug trade. It requires investment from the international community in 
the beginning, but organizations contend it is worthwhile because Afghans will be 
required to take ownership of their local economies; in turn, these programs will become 
more sustainable. This line of reasoning suggests that stronger institutions deter drug 
trafficking because they instill a set of rules and structure which are vital in managing 
corruption and building effective drug treatment programs. 
The last option is legalizing opium so efforts and finances are not spent building 
an agricultural market in Afghanistan that is not profitable or sustainable. These 
supporters claim that neither supply nor demand strategies are strong enough to stop the 
drug trade. In their opinion, once Afghanistan stabilizes, opium production and 
trafficking are likely to transfer to another state, and other areas will fill the void to 
benefit economically.29 Some argue that legalization is the answer because it would 
allow for partnership between regional buyers and international produce firms.30 It would 
reduce funds for belligerents, because “the government would capture the financial gains 
                                                 
26 Chouvy, Opium: Undercovering the Politics of the Poppy, 143; Tullis, Handbook of Research, 57–
71.  
27 Liana Wyler, “International Drug Control Policy,” U.S. Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, DC, 2009), 30; Olivier Maguet and Murtaza Majeed, “Implementing Harm Reduction for 
Heroin Users in Afghanistan, the Worldwide Opium Supplier,” International Journal of Drug Policy 21, 
no. 2 (2010): 119. 
28 Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 414; The GAO’s reasoning was that, “eradication unduly 
punished and alienated farmers for making a ‘rational economic decision’ while ignoring the profits 
gleaned by traffickers and insurgents.”; U.S. GAO, “Afghanistan Drug Control ,” 11 
29 Gives an example of the Balloon Effect; where the massive offense against the Cali cartel in 
Columbia exacerbated the drug problem in Brazil and the Southern Cone; Frank O. Mora, “Victims of the 
Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking and U.S. Policy in Brazil and the Southern Cone of Latin America,” The 
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 21, no. 2 (1996): 138; Past experiences suggest that 
new, “countries might still enter the market, with varying degrees of speed, whether in opiate production, 
trafficking, or consumption.”; Letizia Paoli, The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be cut? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 67.   
30 Nadelmann, “Drugs,” 30; Felbab-Brown, Shooting up, 28. 
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in the form of taxes.”31 A more legal market would in turn make Afghanistan’s 
government more credible and legitimate.32 Legalization would “benefit those who 
struggle with drugs by reducing the risks of overdose and disease associated with 
unregulated products, eliminating the need to obtain drugs from dangerous criminal 
markets, and allowing addiction problems to be treated as medical rather than criminal 
problems.”33  
While this option does sound less expensive and complex, demand-side and 
supply side followers argue that legalization is not feasible at this time, because it is not 
globally supported. One expert contends that the “total supply (production and stocks) of 
opiate raw materials has exceeded the total demand for opiates needed for medical and 
supply purposes.”34 The value of the poppy would also go down because Afghanistan 
would be unable to compete with countries such as India and Australia, which already 
have the facilities and have mastered refining techniques.35  
The challenge with drug trafficking lies in the fact that it is an international 
concern; multiple states must collaborate together to find a solution. Since legalization is 
not an option, the solution to the drug trade lies somewhere in a balance between the 
supply and demand strategies. Enforcing drug trafficking is crucial, but has been proven 
to have serious ramifications if done independently; it has weakened socio-economic and 
political infrastructure in the past. Afghanistan’s best option would be to rebuild drug 
treatment and welfare programs that alleviate poverty and unemployment. If there is less 
desire for drugs within Afghanistan, it will more difficult to recruit individuals in the 
                                                 
31 Felbab-Brown, Shooting up, 28. 
32 Nadelmann, “Drugs,” 30. 
33 Nadelmann, “Drugs,” 28. 
34 “Current Supply of Legal Opium Adequate to Meet World Demand, Says INCB President.” 
International Narcotics Control Board website, accessed October 25, 2011, 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/press_release_2007–11–12_01.html.  
35 Techniques like poppy Straw Extraction (PSE) are far more advanced than anything Afghanistan 
could offer. Poppy straw is the name applied to all parts (except the seeds) of the opium poppy plant, after 
mowing, from which narcotics can be extracted. This method is important because it extracts morphine 
from the capsules and upper parts of the poppy stem after mowing to manufacture opium alkaloids; Robert 
Gregg. “The United Nations and the Opium Problem,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
13, no. 1 (1964): 102–104. 
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drug trade. If Afghans have an increased awareness about the harmful effects of drug 
production and have social services to assist them during the transition, they may be more 
eager to switch to an alternative occupation.  
Since the previous section suggests that the best way to combat the drug trade is 
through a balance of supply-side and demand-side strategies, these next three sections 
will create a framework for the case studies. The goal is to create a more integrated 
approach to development. By connecting the two sets of literature (economic and 
security/governance) and adding a psychological component, this thesis should be able to 
identify key provincial constraints to consider when developing drug treatment programs 
in Afghanistan.  
B. ECONOMIC COMPONENT 
This section evaluates how donor agencies and regional experts have attempted to 
respond to Afghan poverty in the past and gives recommendations on ways to move 
forward. This component is relatively aligned with the supply-side strategy and argues 
that economic programs will decrease poverty rates,36 reduce the insurgent movement, 
and create a more unified community approach. Since addiction is linked to employment 
in Afghanistan, preventative education and interventions need should be included in the 
economic reconstruction plan.  
From the economic standpoint, greed or grievances start civil wars. More jobs 
reduce conflict because rebels will have less desire to join insurgent groups if their 
complaints are managed.37 This thesis argues that the best way to improve transparency 
and corruption is by including welfare services, like drug treatment programs, that direct 
services to the poor and advocates for them. If society rejects addicted ex-combatants, 
they will struggle with the transition and mostly likely object to new civil structures. A 
                                                 
36 David Mansfield, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Counternarcotic Efforts and their Effects in 
Nangarhar and Helmand in the 2010–11 Growing Season (Research Report: AREU, 2011), 10; U.S. GAO, 
“Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan,” Congressional Report (Washington, DC, 2007), 
10. 
37 Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, Winning Hearts and Minds Through 
Development (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011), 2; Paul Collier, Anke 
Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 12. 
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community referral system for social services would increase the actors involved, 
introduce new formal practices at the community level, and improve accountability.  
In the past, experts have tried to incorporate economics by constructing 
alternative livelihood programs, which have incentivized diversification of new crops.38 
Diversification is influential in breaking the drug cycle and reducing addiction rates; 
however many report it ineffective in Afghanistan because it is not supported by stronger 
institutions.39 Projects approved are known to be “highly-visibility, quick-impact” and 
are often perceived as too risky in rural regions.40 The UNODC recommends fighting the 
drug trade and poverty simultaneously, but this is difficult to manage if communities lack 
institutional capacity and are slow to respond to political constraints.41 By including 
social services, like drug treatment, to alternative livelihood programs there will be less 
uncertainty regarding success of project, because processes will be embedded in civil 
society. Having a formal social welfare system in place will improve transparency for 
actors involved, create a more localized approach, and implant long-term objectives.  
While there is no single answer to ending poverty, there are steps that the 
international community and Afghanistan can take to improving an individual addict’s 
financial situation. Table two lists economic components that are influential in improving 
recovery capital in Afghanistan. In turn, these questions can help to capture the variation 
between provinces and will be used to comparatively analyze the three case studies. To 
improve the economic situation, a first step would be to implement incentives in policies 
and financial institutions so that the poor benefit. To further assist the poor population, 
community programs should be networked so that Afghans know where to find 
resources. If employment and welfare programs are linked to drug treatment programs, it 
                                                 
38  Paula Kantor and Adam Pain, Rethinking Rural Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan (Kabul: AREU, 
2011), 1–4. 
39 Chouvy, Opium: Undercovering the Politics of the Poppy, 163; Paula Newberg, “Surviving State 
Failure: Internal War and Regional Conflict in Afghanistan’s Neighborhood,” in Rethinking the Economics 
of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, ed. Cynthia Arnson and William Zartman (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 207; Robert Looney, “Trends: Afghanistan Strung Out,” The Milken 
Institute Review (2009): 15. 
40 Felbab-Brown. Shooting up, 145. 
41 Looney, “Trends,” 14.  
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may be easier for addicts to adjust to their old environment. Instead of turning to drugs, 
addicts can seek counsel from a case worker or a community support group. Additionally, 
diversifying the market while simultaneously reducing corruption will push addict to turn 
to legal crops.    
Table 2.   Economic Components of Drug Treatment Center Assessment 
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C. SECURITY/GOVERNANCE COMPONENT 
This section evaluates security/governance in Afghanistan and gives 
recommendations on ways to improve drug policies. While security and governance are 
two separate issues, they are connected together in this literature review because a 
counter-narcotic approach requires both elements to have been addressed simultaneously. 
A strong policing system ensures the stability necessary for economic diversification and 
productivity; and a credible government complements enforcement and reduces illegal 
acts. This component is aligned with the supply-side strategy and claims that 
accountability and transparency within government along with a stronger justice system 
would alleviate corruption.42 By adding the drug treatment component to 
security/governance, programs will be further enriched because more funds would be 
prioritized to local institutions.  
From the standpoint of security/governance, conflict is not perpetuated by greed 
but rather created from economic opportunities in the Afghan conflict.43 While this is 
mainly an economic concern, it becomes a governance issue when leaders cannot provide 
                                                 
42 Fatima Ayub and Sari Kouvo, “Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror 
and the Future of Afghanistan,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 651. 
43 Arnson, “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate,” 11. 
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services to their impoverished population, because money is not being distributed at the 
government level in a way which benefits civil society. For example, “seven percent of 
the country’s population of 24 million profited from the $2.3 billion in trade.”44 Instead 
of putting attention towards reconstruction, officials should create a stronger political 
structure that encourages private actors to react responsibly and invest in revenues.45 
More dependable institutions would improve relationships that have been hurt by “the 
gradual decline of the security situation.”46 As enforcement improves, drug trafficking 
should become riskier which will cause Afghans to switch to new markets.  
While security/governance is crucial to development, it is sensitive issue because 
it also concerns a nation’s sovereignty. The United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), states that, “illicit drug trade undermines virtually every aspect of the U.S. 
and Afghan governments’ efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.”47 D’monte 
recommends institutional reform as well as assistance from intelligence agencies; he feels 
they need “to be brought within the purview of law and supervision by parliament as well 
as made accountable before the judiciary with personal liability for doing what is an 
offence insofar as against any individual, state or society.”48 Having international 
standards to manage drugs would be beneficial but difficult to coordinate. Even with 
strong international intentions, policies are often enforced in a way that punishes the 
farmer and benefits the drug dealer. Putting more attention on policies that punish higher 
officials would help insurgent groups see the severity of the situation.  
Including drug treatment would further decrease addiction as well as increase 
international involvement in institution building; the issue of sovereignty would not be as 
concerning, because it would be done at the local level. To build transparent institutions, 
                                                 
44 Newberg, “Surviving State Failure,” 207. 
45 Jonathan Goodhand, “Corruption or Consolidating the Peace? The Drug Economy and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (2008): 406–407. 
46 Ayub and Kouvo. “Righting the Course?” 651. 
47  “The production of opium competes with the country’s licit agricultural industry, provides funds to 
insurgents, and fuels corruption.”; U.S. GAO, “Afghanistan Drug Control ,” 1. 
48 Darryl D’Monte, “Corruption, Safety and Environmental Hazard in Asian Societies,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 35, no. 33 (August 2000): 2967.   
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research suggests that organizations should focus on improving accountability practices, 
making statements public and simplifying systems/branches so that rules and guidelines 
are straightforward. 49 Afghanistan should tailor its own model when pursing foreign aid 
and have a mix of bottom-up and top-down strategies to ensure both locals and the 
central government are contributing equally in regards to decision making.50 Afghanistan 
should prevent “incentives for the growth of the combat and shadow economies—
including the tightening of borders which prevent legal cross border trade, the repression 
of Islamic groups, human rights abuses and the cutting back of public services.”51 While 
these recommendations for fixing governance are useful, some policy ideas may not be 
realistic considering Afghanistan has minimal resources and funds. The justice and police 
system is too weak to implement and enforce drug policies.52 Since a high percentage of 
police are either addicted or involved in the drug trade, the international community will 
need to oversee programs, at least initially. There also needs to be a plan in place so that 
the Afghan ownership once international troops leave Afghanistan.   
Managing corruption will improve the drug trafficking situation, ensure that 
money is going to the poor, and help stabilize Afghanistan’s government; nevertheless it 
is not the overall solution to ending the population’s dependency on drugs. These efforts 
need to be combined with socio-economic principles to be most efficient. Table three 
provides a few recommendations to consider when linking security/government to the 
case studies. To build strong treatment programs, Afghanistan needs to first improve its 
security, justice, and police systems to ensure that drug policies are enforced. To 
minimize corruptions, policies can be created strategically to deter drug trafficking. 
International police may want to initially assist in monitoring and enforcing new policies 
and procedures to reduce the chance of new institutions losing credibility. Lastly, drug 
treatment should be provided to police and prisoners to reduce criminal acts in society. 
                                                 
49 Sue Cavukk and M Sohail, “Increasing Strategic Accountability: A Framework for International 
NGOs,” Development in Practice 17, no. 2 (April 2007): 247.  
50 Jonathon Goodhand, “Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in 
Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 854. 
51 Jonathon Goodhand, “From War Economy to Peace Economy: Reconstruction and State Building 
in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs, 58 (2004): 168. 
52  Ayub and Kouvo, “Righting the Course,” 656. 
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D. PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENT 
This subcategory seeks to understand psychological barriers at both the individual 
and community levels that prevent rehabilitation clinics and drug treatment programs 
from being effective. The psychological component suggests that the best way to reduce 
opium consumption is by: improving social challenges, enhancing recovery capital, and 
stimulating drug awareness programs. Since there is little research on mental health in 
Afghanistan, this section will assess the arguments of political scientists and 
psychologists whose primary focus and expertise is on developing post conflict societies.  
Drug treatment centers often lack the capacity to help addicts; it is difficult to find 
qualified counselors and pharmacists, who are experienced in behavioral psychotherapy 
and/or specializes in drug addiction.53 According to Rawson, “there are no accredited 
addiction counselor training programs in the entire Middle East.”54 Treatment centers 
lack administrative personnel and social workers, which provide structure when an addict 
decides to reenter the community. Additionally, language skills and cultural training are 
oftentimes absent in more diverse/rural regions. Even if outside resources are brought 
into Afghanistan, locals will need to be trained on how to best assist patients and families 
in quitting drugs.  
Drug treatment centers’ capacity could be improved by “publish[ing] documents 
that aim to reduce the gap between research and practice” and creating an academic 
                                                 
53 David MacDonald, Afghanistan’s Hidden Drug Problem: The Misuse of Psychotropics (Kabul: 
AREU, 2008), 5; U.S. State Department, “Demand Reduction Program: Afghanistan,” last modified May 
13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/141848.htm.    
54 Richard Rawson, “Building an Addiction Workforce in the Middle East: A counselor Training 
Program Partnership between Kasr Al-Ainy and UCLA” (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute 
Viewpoints: Public Health in the Middle East, 2011), 23. 
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network within society.55 Many believe this gap originated from misunderstandings of 
addiction; individuals do not always perceive it as a real medical concern. To increase 
evidence-based research, scholars should “make relevant research findings available to 
practitioners, in formats that are useful to busy treatment personnel whose daily patient 
responsibilities often preclude them from scouring journal articles or from preforming 
extensive literature searches.”56 Another approach encourages organizations to 
strengthening drug treatment programs by enhancing employee’s skills through trainings 
and conferences.57 More educated counselors and pharmacists creates more legitimacy in 
treatment programs and provides a framework for social change in the policy realm. As 
addicts become less impoverished and new businesses are created, there will be more 
desire to advocate for issues such as human rights concerns and the drug trafficking 
market. 
Intervention programs will also need to be assessed to ensure they are addressing 
cultural concerns while maintaining an international standard. A key controversy in this 
regard is the use of methadone and harm reduction services in drug treatment clinics. In 
addition, rural treatment centers are using traditional approaches rather than evidence-
based research. For example, one clinic used short-term attempts to alleviate withdrawal; 
addicts end up relapsing immediately because they did not know how to deal with 
physical cravings, daily routines, or stressful situations.58 Afghan clinics should 
accommodate cultural concerns, but also be realistic when decreasing addiction rates. 
Teaching Afghan addicts how to manage behavioral urges and cope with stress 
will be extremely difficult, especially considering the impact that war has on them. War 
oftentimes creates a sense of myopic behavior, which can cause fragile states to make 
poor policy decision and for individuals to choose risky lifestyles. Many Afghans suffer 
                                                 
55 Patricia Marinelli-Casey, Catherine Domier, and Richard Rawson, “The Gap between Research and 
Practice in Substance Abuse Treatment,” Psychiatric Services (2002): 984. 
56 E. Gordis, “Linking Research with Practice: Common Bonds, Common Progress,” Alcohol, Health 
and Research World 15, no. 3 (1991): 173. 
57 St. Walters et al., “Effectiveness of Workshop Training for Psychosocial Addiction Treatments: A 
Systematic Review,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 29, no. 4 (2005): 283. 
58 Macdonald, Afghanistan’s Hidden Drug Problem, 14. 
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from mental illnesses such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Mental health issues increase the likelihood of drug dependency because it 
intersects with “social issues associated with their substance use that make diminishing or 
abstaining from substance use extremely difficult.”59 Even though Afghans have 
expressed a desire to seek treatment, they cannot conceptualize how to break the physical 
and the emotional parts of the addiction. Some of the most well-known techniques to help 
individuals are motivational interviewing, cognitive behavior counseling, family-based 
treatment, and contingency management interventions which will be further discussed in 
case studies.60  
Psychologists and political scientists argue that counseling is best done through 
PTSD and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs.61 
Assisting ex-combatants and victims of war with psychological trauma helps equip them 
to deal with post war economy, ensures reintegration, and reduces the chance of them 
becoming a threat to society.62 Research has also been shown that, “the sooner the 
diagnosis is made the better the chance of therapeutic success” for PTSD patients.63 
Helping Afghans manage psychological concerns before reintegration will shorten the 
length of treatment needed and allow for funding to go to new avenues.   
While ex-combatants are a good population group to target, psychologists should 
sensitive to their challenges and create a more tailored approach. Drug treatment 
programs could set addicts up for failure if their ability to stay of drugs feels unattainable. 
                                                 
59 Clinic allowed patients to use painkillers and tranquilizers for six months after leaving treatment. 
Patients were at a disadvantage because they were experiencing withdrawal outside of the clinic; Victoria 
Smye et al., “Harm Reduction, Methadone Maintenance Treatment and the Root Causes of Health and 
Social Inequities: An Intersectional Lens in the Canadian Context,” Harm Reduction Journal (2011): 3. 
60 Kimberley Kirby et al., “Substance abuse treatment providers’ beliefs and objections regarding 
contingency management: Implications for dissemination,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 85 (2006): 19–
27; Patricia Marinelli-Casey, Catherine Domier, and Richard Rawson, “The Gap between Research and 
Practice,” 984–986.  
61 Lynn August and Barbara Gianola, “Symptoms of War Trauma Induced Psychiatric Disorders: 
Southeast Asian Refugees and Vietnam Veterans,” International Migration Review 21, no. 3 (1987): 830. 
62 Alpaslan Özerdem, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in 
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 
968. 
63 Roger Gabriel and Leigh Neal, “Lesson Of The Week: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Following 
Military Combat Or Peace Keeping,” British Medical Journal 324, no. 7333 (2002): 341. 
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Reintegrating into a new environment, starting a job, and coping with psychological 
trauma could be too much pressure. If ex-combatants are pushed too quickly, they may 
not seek medical help, which is known to be a common response for victims. Strategists 
should also be careful in giving preferential treatment, because it could cause a backlash 
within civil society.64 The international community does not want to discourage those 
who have been loyal to rebuilding Afghanistan. Since there are many Afghans suffering 
from drug dependency and minimal rooms in treatment programs, confrontation could 
easily occur within various groups. To see improvement in DDR programs, they must be, 
“designed in such a way that the reintegration trajectories of participants can be usefully 
compared with those of nonparticipants.”65 Designating alternative programs to assist 
individuals with PTSD will be beneficial in helping mitigate a backlash and prioritize 
mental illness. 
Since Afghanistan is unique in its conflict and overall capacity, additional 
psychological components should be considered when evaluating the case studies. Table 
four distinguishes key constraints which prohibit the enhancement of drug trafficking, 
economic, and security/governance components. For example, confidentiality is a 
variable because Afghan addicts do not want to be ousted by their community or 
subjected to severe rejection from family or friends. Self-help groups and preventative 
campaigns could assist in relieving fear and rejection. If there is less stigmatization, there 
is a greater chance that ex-combatants will reintegrate back into the community. Small 





                                                 
64 Özerdem, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 973. 
65 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” The Journal of 
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E. CONCLUSION—CLOSING THE LITERATURE GAP 
Both trafficking and addiction will continue to be an ongoing problem for 
Afghanistan. Strategies that have been used to manage drug trafficking (e.g., crop 
substitution, eradication, and legalization) have widened the poverty gap within 
Afghanistan. Building stronger social service programs for addicts, will lessen the 
poverty gap and reinforce the need for more transparent and legitimate institutions. There 
is a great deal of information on how to create a “successful” rehabilitation program, but 
little on how to develop clinics with tools to manage cultural diversity, opium cultivation, 
and conflict. Afghanistan’s environmental, political, and economic constraints make it 
difficult to give a cookie-cutter response that will be applicable in all circumstances. It is 
also difficult to compare it to Western practices because Afghans have different views on 
women’s rights, family responsibilities, and religious views.  
Since drugs are so ingrained in Afghanistan’s sociopolitical, economic, and 
cultural context, the best solution is to connect the structural issues of 
security/governance and economic dimensions to psychological constraints. Addiction 
rates will continue to increase if drug treatment center capacity is not developed, if 
unemployment and poverty programs are not introduced, if high officials misuse funds, 
and if economic markets are not implemented to divert drug trafficking. Individuals will 
be more successful in quitting if they are not influenced by drug users, if they are in 
regions where there is less ethnic conflict, and if they have stronger family or community 
support. Understanding what services are available to the public and how they fit 
Afghanistan’s societal norms will be crucial to ensuring that the nine UNODC/WHO 
good practice components are implemented successfully in treatment programs. Afghans 
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need to be able to trust that the government and international organizations have their 
best interests in mind. Creating new techniques for each region will increase the 
likelihood of less addiction and generate community involvement, which is essential in 
the reconstruction phase.  
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III. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF DRUG TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS IN THREE AFGHAN PROVINCES 
A. CASE STUDY COMPARATIVE METHOD 
This chapter assesses how well Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan regions 
perform along the nine UNODC/WHO good practice components in order to better 
understand how individual and socio-economic indicators affect drug treatment program 
capabilities. The purpose of evaluating provincial capacity is to better understand what 
key variables prevent addicts from being successfully treated, so that policy makers can 
create a more comprehensive community approach. This evaluation is done by assessing 
Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan’s ability to allocate resources to addicts by comparing 
recovery capital—the amount of individually tailored and societal support available for 
an addict to quit successfully.66 Recovery capital in each province is measured instead of 
relapse rates, because individual capabilities differ between addicts. For example, some 
patients have been able to quit on motivation alone while others have an abundance of 
resources and still end up relapsing. While quitting “cold turkey” is not recommended 
and has been proven less effective in the long run, the example illustrates how 
community factors can influence an individual’s motivation and confidence to maintain 
strong throughout the process of quitting. If addicts cannot see their situation improving 
by seeking help, they may remain ambivalent. By examining provincial recovery capital, 
the thesis can thoroughly understand addict’s triggers and link them to community 
resources.  
While the term “recovery capital” best explains how a community can 
collectively engage and empower addicts through physical, emotional and social triggers, 
it is not the only variable that must be measured. It does not describe how programs and 
policies can be introduced at a national level to empower local participation. Post-conflict 
countries, like Afghanistan, have regions that are vulnerable to drug addiction. These 
                                                 
66 Alexandre B. Laudet, “The Road to Recovery: Where are we going and how do we get there? 
Empirically-driven conclusions and future directions for service development and research,” Substance Use 
Misuse 43, no. 12–13 (2008): 2012. 
 28 
high risk areas are often prone to conflict, are near border areas that are less secure, or in 
highly dense regions as a result of migration. The uncertainty of survival produces 
inadequate socio-economic infrastructure that weaken family and community networks. 
The decline in collective action becomes a national concern because political policies 
become more difficult to initiate, develop, and enforce. Individuals begin to lose hope in 
their social support groups and turn to new devices to manage their pain and suffering. To 
fully assess drug treatment programs, Afghanistan will need to be evaluated at the 
individual level (to see how perceptions effect addicts motivation and confidence), at the 
local level (to see how the community is engaged), and at the national level (to see if 
there is a solid political economic framework.) This thesis will focus on the provincial 
level, but connect local and national barriers which can keep communities from providing 
services to their citizens. 
B. RESULTS 
A review of the case studies makes it clear that Afghanistan has a great deal of 
variation in drug treatment capabilities at the provincial level. The differences become 
even more apparent as community leadership and recovery capital are evaluated to 
explain inconsistencies. Table 5 summarizes my assessment of each studied region’s 
ability (low, medium, or high) to adhere to the UNODC and WHO nine components; and 
the following sections then provide the deeper analysis upon which this summary 
assessment rests. I score Kabul as the strongest province, because it had the largest 
amount of resources, community networks, and research capabilities. While these results 
were predicted, since it is the capital of Afghanistan, it should be noted that Kabul has 
much work that must be done before it meets the standards of more developed countries. 
The study finds that Kabul is still reliant on donors, has high corruption within its 
administration, and scores poorly on a few of the nine components.  
 Badakhshan and Kandahar score similarly in my assessment; however, there are 
a few dimensions that suggest that Kandahar may be a bit stronger when it comes to 
distributing drug treatment resources to rural regions. The most surprising result is that 
Kandahar ranks equally to Kabul on a few of the components. This was unexpected since 
the initial assessment hypothesized that insecurity, poppy cultivation, and weak markets 
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in Kandahar would prevent the region from providing adequate care to its poor 
population. Its increased resource capacity can be attributed to its strong tribal networks 
and donor funds allocated to combat counter-narcotics and conflict. Local tribal leaders 
in Kandahar are able to use their linkages to their advantage and create systems quickly. 
Instead of starting from scratch, they revised their previous health structure to include 
drug treatment which enhanced the quality and coordination of community services at the 
provincial level. While their tribal linkages were extremely useful, they also prove to be a 
disadvantage when mission objectives are contradictory. 
While Badakhshan is seen as the weakest of the three case studies, it is strong 
when compared to other provinces in Afghanistan. Areas like Badakhshan, Nangahar, 
Herat, and Kandahar receive more funding for drug treatment, because they have high 
population density, their residents are perceived as high-risk, they are involved in the 
illicit drug industry, and/or have a large percentage of injection drug users (IDUs). The 
reason why Badakhshan has decreased recovery capital is because its extreme poverty, 
rugged terrain, and less donor funds which make it difficult to coordinate services to its 
residents. While it has the basic infrastructure set up in the provincial capital and has 
specialized in a few target populations, it lacks resource capabilities and awareness in 
getting services to more rural regions.  
Table 5.   Drug Treatment Capabilities in Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan Province 





Availability and Access to Drug 
Treatment MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM 
Screening, Assessment, 
Diagnosis, and Treatment 
Planning 
MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM LOW 
Evidence Informed Treatment MEDIUM LOW LOW 
Human Rights and Patient 
Dignity MEDIUM/HIGH LOW LOW/MEDIUM 
Targeting Special Groups and 
Conditions MEDIUM/HIGH MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM 
Criminal Justice  System LOW/MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM LOW 
Community Involvement MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM LOW 
Clinical Governance LOW/MEDIUM LOW LOW 
Coordination of Services LOW/MEDIUM LOW/MEDIUM LOW 
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1. Component #1: Availability and Access to Drug Treatment 
My review of research concerning the three studied regions concludes that all 
three provinces lacked availability and access to drug treatment. The main reason is that 
funding for drug addiction is not prioritized in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan National 
Health Account (NHA) states that only 4 percent of the government budget goes to health 
services and, of those total expenditures, only 5% goes toward preventative and public 
health services, including drug treatment.67 The report acknowledges these deficiencies 
and states that the government is reliant on donors and future outcomes are dependent on 
international support. With such a large portion of foreign aid, the following questions 
should be asked in regards to sustainability and selectivity: How are resources allocated 
and chosen? Have donors been able to make a stronger push in provinces that they 
perceive as most important?  
While there are no direct answers, it seems that that funds are distributed to 
populated provinces that are perceived to have the most “at risk” drug users, since the 
areas with most drug treatment capacity are: involved in the drug trade, have high 
population density from intense migration, are near drug trafficking routes, and/or have 
suffered from conflict. At the moment, there are 12 provinces that do not have drug 
rehabilitation services for their residents.68 As far as donor support, research suggests 
that the international communication has influenced central government’s decisions; 
however, how much and their role in implementing provincial programs is debatable. 
This can be seen with Southern Afghanistan, which receives the highest support (besides 
the nation’s capital region) and is of great interest to the international community. 
When ranking each province for availability and access to drug treatment, Kabul 
has medium capacity, while Kandahar and Badakhshan have low/medium capacity. In 
2009, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) put together Table 6, which lists active 
health care facilities in each province that residents can use when needing medical 
                                                 
67 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Afghanistan National Health Accounts 2008–2009 
(Kabul: USAID, 2011), 17.  
68 Rainer Gonzalez Palau, “Drug Abuse and Treatment Facilities in Afghanistan,” Civil-Military 
Fusion Centre: Afghanistan in Transition (2012): 3.  
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assistance. The study found that Kabul had 137 centers, Kandahar had 43 centers, and 
Badakhshan had 79 centers. While the amount of facilities looks adequate for a 
developing post-conflict province, the services provided in mobile clinics, basic health 
care, and sub health centers are minimal and standards are considered below par. Most 
health workers are not trained in mental illness or drug addiction. Even though Kandahar 
has less health facilities than Badakhshan in the table below, it has more comprehensive 
health centers available to its citizens. These health facilities are able to provide more 
advanced treatment for addicts than the basic health care and sub health centers. 
Table 6.   List of Active Health Facilities by Province in 200969 
 
While all three provinces have some sort of specialization, they are also known to 
have low bed occupancy rates which mean difficulty accessing drug treatment services. 
One treatment program in Kandahar reportedly had 1,133 addicts on its waiting list.70 A 
WHO report confirms the need for more resources; the estimate states that 20 percent of 
Afghan addicts need residential inpatient treatment yet current infrastructures allows only 
2 percent to have access.71 Gaining access to Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) 
is furthermore taxing in rural areas, where service times are limited. Many Afghans are 
“forced to seek treatment at BPHS facilities either “after hours” (at higher costs) or as 
NHA findings seem to indicate, private facilities which are traditionally more expensive.”  
                                                 
69 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, “List of Active Health Facilities by Province in 2009,” 
last modified April 13, 2009, http://www.moph.gov.af/.   
70 Relief Web, “Afghanistan: Despite Counter-Narcotics Efforts, Number of Drug Addicts still High 
in Kandahar,” last modified June 27, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/despite-counter-narcotics-
efforts-number-drug-addicts-still-high-kandahar.  
71 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, National Drug Demand Reduction 



















Clinic Other Total 
Kabul 20   6 36 60 2 3 10 137 
Kandahar  1  1 16 16 1 2 6 43 
Badakhshan   1 1 13 35 21 4 4 79 
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Kabul ranked higher than Kandahar and Badakhshan because it has significantly 
more drug treatment services and has a more advanced 24-hour detoxification hospital, 
which was opened by the International Medical Corps and the MOPH in January 2011. It 
serves as the “only public national referral mental health hospital and drug abuse center 
for all of Afghanistan, while also serving the needs of all psychiatric patients in Kabul.”72 
While this hospital sounds impressive, the Canadian Women for Women organization 
noted that the program has multiple administration and quality-control concerns. Their 
report described its weaknesses: “The hospital, long notorious for its dilapidated and 
unhygienic state, has only 60 beds; while experts say at least a 300-bed facility is 
needed...[it] remains the only mental health hospital in the country, despite 
announcements by the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) back in 2006 that 30-bed 
mental health hospitals would be open in every region of the country.”73 Dr. Hamid 
Folad74 of the MOPH stated in an interview / e-mail that “Kandahar and Badakhshan 
recently opened up detoxification hospitals and that Kandahar had both day and night 
time IDP services available.” He further said that psycho social and drug addiction 
treatment capabilities exist in both these detoxification hospitals. While the MOPH is 
moving in a positive direction, research suggests that these centers are still weak because 
they are newly developed, lack expertise, and have limited capacity. 
2. Component #2: Screening, Assessment, Diagnosis, and Treatment 
Planning 
In terms of provincial human capital for screening, assessment, diagnosis, and 
treatment planning, I conclude that Kabul has medium capacity, Kandahar has 
low/medium capacity, and Badakhshan has low capacity. Afghanistan lacks quality 
interventions for addicts because there are not many skilled professionals that know how 
to adequately screen, assess, diagnose, and treat a patient. Currently, evidence-based 
research is completed through the psychology department in Kabul University. 
                                                 
72 International Medical Corps, “Afghanistan: Mental Health and Substance Misuse,” last modified 
2012, http://internationalmedicalcorps.org/page.aspx?pid=2273  
73 Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, “Women & Mental Health in Afghanistan,” last 
modified February 23, 2011, http://www.cw4wafghan.ca/MentalHealth. 
74 Dr. Hamid Folad is the Deputy Program Manager for DDR Program at the MOPH 
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According to its website, there are approximately sixty students being taught the 
necessary skills. Once students are finished with their education, they can “work as 
educational manager of higher education, lecturers in teacher’s educational institutes, 
advisers in psychology, senior advisors of schools, education inspectors and employees 
of the women and social affairs ministries.”75 Although this university has a mental 
health department, it only supports a small number of students. As mentioned in the first 
component, Afghanistan has only one detoxification hospital that is capable of supporting 
addicts with psychological co-morbidity disorders. Considering the number of individuals 
suffering from PTSD and other conflict-related mental illnesses, the absence of a national 
mental health program is discouraging. If Afghan addicts were able to manage additional 
mental health issues, it would decrease triggers and make quitting more manageable. This 
is the primary reason why Kabul did not receive medium/high status. 
One of the main challenges for provinces outside of Kabul is recruiting educated 
locals to do counseling. “Most psychologists do not want to go to insecure areas like 
Kandahar, Helmand, and Khost provinces.” says Dr. Hamid Folad.76 Since there is such a 
demand for drug counseling, program directors have had to rely on short courses for their 
staff. These trainings are being done in Kandahar and Badakhshan by agencies such as 
the UNODC and the Colombo Plan. While it is great that Afghanistan has implemented a 
localized approach, doing short courses is only a temporary solution. Having educated 
influential leaders in rural provinces increases the likelihood that interventions are more 
advanced, drug prevention/awareness education is prioritized, and provincial barriers that 
hinder cooperation between the MOPH and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) are 
better understood by policy makers.   
The reason why Kandahar scored slightly higher than Badakhshan was because it 
was seen as more interactive in its recruitment of health workers. Kandahar province has 
been able to use its tribal leaders to recruit community volunteers and to increase drug 
awareness. For example, the Drug Demand Program (DDR) organized a two-day 
workshop in 2000 that included a wide variety of community leaders. Of the 70 
                                                 
75 Kabul University, “Psychology,” ND, http://ku.edu.af/en/page/884 
76 Dr. Hamid Folad is the Deputy Program Manager for DDR Program at the MOPH 
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individuals that were invited, there were “religious scholars, shura members, teachers, 
tribal elders, resource persons, influential people and farmers [who were all trained] on 
the harmful effects of drugs on health, education, society, economy and ethic of 
people.”77 Including more groups increases awareness in the community and instills a 
more community-based approach. 
Even though skill levels vary in each province, the MOPH has been proactive in 
creating a professional package for psychosocial counselors. They can use this tool when 
assessing and screening patients. It was written in 2008 and made available in English, 
Dari, and Pashto. The professional package has two sections: counseling skills and 
psychopathology.78 The first section outlines intervention techniques and provides a list 
of outside resources that improve addict’s likelihood of quitting. The second section 
describes warning signs of common mental disorders and gives recommendations on how 
to support patients who are experiencing symptoms. In the substance abuse and 
dependence chapter, it suggests that counselors explore: withdrawal symptoms and their 
severity, mode and frequency of use, psychosocial stressors, and impacts on patient’s 
daily routine.79 All of these indicators are important when creating an individual 
treatment plan. It additionally recommends referring a patient to a rehabilitation clinic if 
they experience one of the following: “withdrawal symptoms are severe, there is a suicide 
attempt or risk of suicide, there is a possible associated physical illness, initial counseling 
was not effective, mental disorder is present, [or] use of traditional remedies.”80 While 
the MOPH has developed resources for counselors, one must question how likely are 
these professional packages used? Are they in all medical centers and drug treatment 
clinics? Does availability effect how doctors and counselors screen? Are counselors 
following the list of symptoms or just recommending the most severe patients?  
                                                 
77 Relief Web, “Afghanistan Weekly Update No. 383,” 1. 
78 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Professional Package for Psychosocial Counselors 
Working in the BPHS in Afghanistan (Kabul: Mental Health Department of the MOPH, 2008), table of 
contents.  
79 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Professional Package, 81. 
80 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Professional Package, 81. 
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3. Component #3: Evidence-Informed Treatment 
Some evidence-based research has been conducted in Afghanistan on drug 
demand and harm reduction services; however, it is limited and mostly focuses on 
decreasing addiction to prevent outbreaks of HIV/AIDS. Usually scientific methods are 
first tested in Kabul, since it is the most convenient location, and then implemented in 
other provinces if the project is successful. The most scientific ones began in 2005 by 
Catherine Todd, an Associate Research Scientist at Columbia University’s Department 
of Obstetrics and Gynecology; her studies in Afghanistan primarily focus on IDUs in 
Kabul. Her research has stated that there are a lack of resources and education in regards 
to harm reduction services. She additionally explores the most common reasons for drug 
use and states that refugees are at greatest risk, because they are the most vulnerable to 
socio-economic conditions and most likely to experience psychological trauma which can 
lead to more risky behaviors81. More evidence-based research and resources needs to be 
constructed in Afghanistan to ensure a more unified health care system is built. 
Technological approaches, like geographic information system (GIS) mapping and rapid 
situation assessments, can further enhance and extend research projects.82 Examples of 
topics to study are: evaluating social-economic impacts of drug use, examining how 
culture impacts interventions, and assessing community referral systems. 
Evaluating evidence-informed research in each province, Kabul has medium 
capacity while Kandahar and Badakhshan have low capacity. Kandahar and Badakhshan 
are equal in capabilities for the reason that there have only been a handful of drug 
addiction studies done in these provinces. The reason why Kabul did not receive higher 
capacity in evidence-informed treatment is, because policy makers and the MCN have 
not permitted citizens to use Opium Substitution Therapy (OST)—such as methadone 
treatment. In Afghanistan, detoxification is the primary method used in drug treatment 
facilities; this method is known to be less effective and has high relapse rates of 
                                                 
81 Catherine Todd, Naquibullah Safi, and Steffanie Strathdee, “Drug Use and Harm Reduction in 
Afghanistan,” Harm Reduction Journal 2. no. 13 (2005): 4. 
82 UNODC, Reducing Drug Demand and HIV in Afghanistan, Time Frame: June 2010 – July 2012, 
(UNODC, 2010), 5.  
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approximately 92%.83 OST has been studied for over 20 years; research has proven that it 
is ultimate mechanism for “addressing chronic and repeated relapsing opiate 
dependency.”84 It additionally can be used to improve socio economic conditions, such 
as crimes and HIV rates. According to one progress report, data suggest that only 0.04 
percent of addicts can access methadone.85 Those who have access to methadone in 
Afghanistan are getting it from foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
Kabul, who are not aligned with the MOPH and MCN.  
To give some background on the OST controversy, it would be best to explain the 
roles of the MCN and the MOPH. The MCN is responsible for guiding drug policy while 
the MOPH is accountable for project implementation in the community. While these 
organizations work collaboratively, their responsibilities oftentimes mesh and result in 
miscommunications. For example, arguments arise when discussing harm reduction 
approaches. The MCN see methods like OST as a culturally sensitive issue and it 
demands a more conservative approach. It would prefer to remain abstinence-focused to 
ensure programs meet the overarching goal of reducing illicit substances within the 
community. The MOPH disagrees and favors harm reduction methods, like OST, for the 
reason that it has been proven to be more successful in curbing addiction, minimizing 
social problems within the community, and deterring outbreaks and other health related 
issues from occurring.  
Even though there is still controversy between the two groups, the MOPH and the 
UNODC have moved forward and created a pilot methadone project for 100 Kabul 
patients. They cannot start the project until the memorandum of understanding is 
approved by the MCN. This is not the first time the MOPH has tried to pass a pilot 
project. The MCN has taken action against the new policy by “block[ing] the import of 
                                                 
83 Pavol Stracansky, “Afghanistan: New Therapy Battles Soaring Drug Addiction,” Inter Press 
Service News Agency, April 5, 2011, 1. 
84 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Final: Policy on Opioid Substitution Therapy (Kabul: 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, 2009), 8 
85 WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF, Global HIV/AIDS Response: Epidemic Update and Health Sector 
Progress towards Universal Access (Geneva: WHO, 2011), 130. 
 37 
methadone” twice86 and stopping the initial OST trial to re-examine results.87 Past 
incidents suggest that the implementation process will probably be lengthy. Even if the 
pilot program is successful in Kabul, it is unlikely that OST will be socially accepted in 
Badakhshan or Kandahar. These regions are known to be more conservative and 
distrustful of international donors; thus there is a high likelihood that tribal leaders will 
see methadone treatment as unethical. In addition, it is difficult to integrate new 
approaches in rural regions. Economic implications, low literacy rates, and vast 
population clusters would further complicate Badakhshan and Kandahar’s ability to reach 
vulnerable groups. If the MCN approves the trial, the MOPH will need to create a 
comprehensive OST awareness campaign that is informative as well as culturally 
acceptable for outside provinces.  
4. Component #4: Human Rights and Patient Dignity 
When examining human rights and patient dignity, Kabul has medium/high 
capacity, Kandahar has low capacity, and Badakhshan has low/medium capacity. Kabul 
scored higher because it built the institutional framework for human rights and has 
developed future objectives for drug experts and law enforcement personnel.88 It did not 
receive high capacity status, because it still struggles with enforcing human rights 
policies.89 According to one survey, over half of Afghan women addicts reported “at 
least one form of human rights violations prior to entering the [drug abuse treatment] 
DAT centers.”90 In the future, the MOPH hopes to partner the Independent Human 
Rights Commission of Afghanistan to improve discrimination for vulnerable addicts by: 
                                                 
86 Rubin, “Few Treatment Options for Afghans as Drug Use Rises,” 1. 
87 Stracansky, “Afghanistan: New Therapy Battles,” 1. 
88 The Afghan constitution specifically states that it “prohibits any kind of discrimination against 
Afghan citizens…NSF-II and HIV policy mentioned that all Afghan have equal right to access to 
preventive, treatment and support services free of any kind of discrimination.”; Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan MOPH, Director General of Preventative and Primary Health Care Communicable Disease 
Directorate (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, 2012), 37.   
89 While the Ministry of Justice has taken action and enforced these new policies, their 
implementation is perceived to be relatively poor; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, Director 
General of Preventative, 37. 
90 35% reported gender-based inequality, 36% reported maltreatment, and 4% reported abuse; Abadi, 
Melissa Harris et al., “Examining Human Rights and Mental Health Among Women in Drug Abuse 
Treatment Centers in Afghanistan,” International Journal of Women’s Health (2012), 160.  
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providing substance abuse education, defending drug user’s legal rights, and introducing 
programs that will help the community better understand addiction and the stigma 
associated with it.91  
Managing sensitivities on drug dependency are influential in increasing success 
rates; addicts will feel less depressed and pressured if they feel they are accepted in their 
community. Bad perceptions also make recruitment more difficult; addicts will not seek 
residential treatment if it means that they will lose family ties or clan networks. A 2012 
study surveyed perceptions in Kabul and found that most “participants agreed that 
addiction is a disease (88.6%)” and supported drug treatment programs in Afghanistan.92 
While this rate is impressive, Kabul residents still struggle to accept harm reduction 
programs.93 To manage stigmatization and ensure confidentiality in interventions, all 
three of the case studies offer at-home treatment. The survey recommends that, in the 
future, Kabul focus on prejudices from medical staff, police officers, pharmacists, and 
influential groups. There currently are no surveys in Kandahar and Badakhshan on drug 
abuse perceptions; nonetheless, results are expected to be worse since they have less drug 
counseling and educational/awareness programs.  
Kandahar and Badakhshan received lower scores, because stigmatization was 
reported heavily in these provinces. Discriminatory beliefs have limited participation in 
drug programs as well as kept awareness campaigns from being introduced into the 
community. Past studies have found that tribal leaders and mullahs are resistant to 
provide information about high-risk group activities in their area mostly for fear that 
neighborhoods or individuals could be targeted.94 Research suggests that this would be 
more prevalent in Southern Afghanistan because it is more conflicted. In Kandahar, many 
                                                 
91 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, National Drug Demand Reduction 
Policy 2012–2016, 22. 
92 MR Stanekzai et al., “Baseline Assessment of Community Knowledge and Attitudes toward Drug 
Use and Harm Reduction in Kabul, Afghanistan,” Drug Alcohol Review (2012): 451.  
93 While they are sympathetic towards the challenges of drug dependency, only four percent of 
residents in the Kabul survey felt it was okay to provide harm reduction services; Stanekzai et al., “Baseline 
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94 South Asia Human Development Sector, Mapping and Situation Assessment of Key Populations at 
High Risk of HIV in Three Cities of Afghanistan (The World Bank, 2008), 6. 
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prefer home based treatment because they are afraid of the stigma associated with being a 
drug user.95 Badakhshan women have expressed similar fears when seeking assistance; 
they worry that they will lose their child if they seek help. “Female drug users is a topic 
that is almost never mentioned,” says Ferris-Rotman.96 While both provinces struggle 
with similar issues, Kandahar’s challenges are seen as slightly more severe, because tribal 
networks intensify negative perceptions in the community. When tribal leaders have too 
much political influence, it becomes difficult to ensure equal rights within social services. 
In the past, Kandahar citizens reported difficulty accessing social services (e.g., housing, 
employment, and land ownership) if they were aligned with the wrong tribe or if they 
broke clan ideals/rules.97   
To improve communication between central and provincial governments, 
organizations have begun to include local leaders into harm reduction trainings so that 
each province can create a more individualized approach when tackling human rights 
issues.98 They have additionally tried to include women leaders in hopes that it will 
improve awareness and community acceptance. Confidentiality has been reinforced 
through all research studies, trainings, and drug rehabilitation centers. The Colombo Plan 
is currently collaborating with Afghanistan trainers to draft a code of ethics for the 
country. Once it is approved by authorities, 500 staff members will be trained and given 
the code of ethics to use as a “standard of conduct.”99  
5. Component #5: Targeting Special Groups and Conditions 
The literature review and the UNODC recommend the following special groups 
be targeted when developing drug treatment programs: pharmaceutical users, refugees, 
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patients with co-morbidities, HIV/AIDS patients the mentally ill, women and children, 
prisoners, and police officers. The degree to which special groups are targeted varies 
from province to province. After assessing each region’s ability to assist specialized 
groups, my research suggests that Kabul has medium/high capacity, Kandahar has 
medium capacity, and Badakhshan has low/medium capacity. While all three provinces 
target a variety of programs, none of them had high availability and access to treatment, 
which would have put them at high capacity status.  
a. Pharmaceutical Users 
While high addiction rates are mostly attributed to Afghanistan’s harsh 
environment, it should be noted that Afghan’s decision to rely and consume a variety of 
illicit and licit drugs is ingrained in their culture. Historical tales have increased the 
discovery of newly emerging drugs as well as created a false illusion on the feeling of 
being high.100 In addition, these stories have rationalized the use of prescription drugs as 
an emotional and physical crutch. Many chose opium, because it is less costly, being 
unaware that the high potency would make them drug dependent. 
 There are also reports that pharmaceutical drugs are not being 
administered correctly. If patients want a specific prescription, they will oftentimes 
request it through private pharmacies or pay a marked up rate through illegitimate 
channels. As Macdonald notes, “a wide range of pharmaceutical drugs is available over-
the-counter, without a medical prescription, from ‘pharmacies’, other retail outlets and 
even roadside stalls. Many of these drugs are adulterated, spurious, outdated, and 
unregistered and illicitly manufactured in Pakistan and India.”101 Mixed drug use could 
possibly increase the likelihood of severe mental or physical side effects within the 
Afghan population. These statistics are disturbing because they show the potential for a 
health crisis as well as the severity addiction could have on the next generation if they 
                                                 
100 There are many historical tales that are told in Afghanistan that describe the sensational feeling of 
being intoxicated. For example, there is talk that individuals dry, crush, and smoke scorpions for 
intoxication; David Macdonald, Drug Use in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws, and Scorpion Tales (London: 
Pluto Press, 2007), xix. 
101 David Macdonald, “Drug Use in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws,” 208. 
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continue to use legal and illegal drugs as an emotional crutch. In fact, pharmaceutical use 
is heavily linked to poverty. Health costs constitute the second-largest expenditure for 
Afghan families; it is common to go into debt to pay for medical expenses and 
prescriptions.102 
Kabul is the only location that has done studies on pharmaceutical misuse; 
the province is seen as more progressive, because it has advanced educational awareness 
campaigns and has more quality mental health interventions. Policy makers in Kabul 
have additionally advocated the promotion of rational medicine consumption. While 
there is a policy set up to improve pharmaceutical care, it still needs to be enforced 
nationally to be taken seriously. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
states that there are, “poor dispensing practices and record keeping, insufficient 
knowledge of medicines listed in Afghanistan Essential Drug List and Licensed Drug 
List, weak communication with patients concerning their medications, and avoidance of 
dialogue with doctors to clarify prescriptions.”103 Since Kandahar and Badakhshan are 
closely aligned to tribal networks, have a traditional approach, and expressed difficulty in 
accessing health care, they are more likely to have a higher degree of pharmaceutical 
misuse. Accessing medications is especially concerning for more impoverished and rural 
areas like Badakhshan, where they cannot afford health care. Grace and Pain suggest that 
central government focus on transparency of the health system by, “closely control[ling] 
pharmaceuticals and pharmacies to prevent the sale of ineffective medicines and ensure 
that drugs and antibiotics are only available by prescription.”104 In addition, Afghanistan 
needs to improve economic markets and control medicine costs to ensure that residents 
can afford the medications. 
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b. Refugees 
Most of the research on refugees has been conducted in Kabul. In Todd’s 
opinion, prioritizing refugees will yield positive results because they are more susceptible 
to addiction and have less knowledge regarding the impacts of risky behaviors.105 
Refugees are often linked to other high-risk groups (e.g., as: sex workers, prisoners, 
homeless, and mentally ill) because of their harsh living conditions. To give some 
background, there was a large refugee population that migrated back to Afghanistan after 
the fall of the Taliban. Both Kabul and Kandahar were affected by this rapid migration.106 
Kabul experienced the greatest surge in Afghanistan, because of the steady movement of 
Pakistan and Iranian individuals who returned to the capital in search of a better 
livelihood. Since these two countries have high addictions rates and harsh conditions, 
many of the refugees came back addicted to a wide variety of substances. In the past, 
severe heroin addicts could be found at the Russian cultural center. Due to strong police 
enforcement, Kabul addicts have moved to the “Pul-i-sokhta” bridge and are found in 
small groups, hunched over sheets of foil, heating up opium.107 The winter seasons are 
the worst in Kabul, because severe weather conditions cause addict to increase their 
intake and overdose. 
To improve the situation, the MOPH enriched its refugee program by 
partnering with donors to understanding the daily ramifications that migrants encounter. 
These studies found that a large percentage of refugees in Kabul were unemployed108 and 
expressed difficulty in accessing health services, housing, nutritious food, and sanitized 
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drinking water.109 The Janglaka Drug Treatment Center was first established in Kabul to 
assist addicts living in the Old Russian Cultural Center.110 While the center’s primary 
purpose is detox, it also has out-patient and reintegration services, such as, vocational 
training, family therapy, primary healthcare referrals for patients, and harm reduction 
services. Although referral systems remain weak throughout the province, the ministries 
have received international funds to target new communities, like the “Pul-i-sokhta” 
bridge, that have the most severe addiction cases. Welfare programs which have been put 
in place by donors and the ministries have already begun to see results.111 The challenge 
is that while there have been success stories in certain regions, there remains a large 
percentage of refugees who cannot access services to ensure their quitting drugs is 
successful. For example, the Janglaka Drug Treatment Center can only hold forty 
residents at one time, which means extremely long waiting lists. 
My research suggests that refugee programs are somewhat absent in both 
Kandahar and Badakhshan. This does not mean that refugees are not targeted in drug 
treatment programs. Both provinces mentioned that they try to educate and provide harm 
reduction services to assist risky populations, which includes refugees. While this cannot 
be confirmed, there is a good chance that Kandahar’s tribal hospital, which assists IDPs, 
has simultaneously assisted refugees. To fully understand how refugees are managed in 
Kandahar and Badakhshan, further research would need to be conducted. 
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c. Patients with Multiple Illnesses 
Managing co-morbidities is a national concern that has not been 
addressed; this is another explanation to why all three provinces did not receive a higher 
status in regards to targeting population groups. A patient is diagnosed with co-
morbidities when they have two or more physical or mental illnesses. Providing resources 
for co-morbidity disorders is important, because less physical and mental urges impacts 
success rates. If addicts need assistance with physical illnesses, they can contact a local 
health care center; however if mental support is requested, they have to travel to the 
Kabul hospital. While rehabilitation clinics see the need to connect health services to 
drug counseling, most do not have the capacity to do so because they do not have the 
trained staff. To manage inefficiencies, the MOPH has created specialized trainings as 
well as a counseling package (mentioned in component 2) to increase personnel’s 
confidence in screening, diagnosing, assessing, and developing a treatment plan. While 
most health centers are weak, the detoxification hospitals have specialized services as 
well as nutritional care. All of these health services are free if they access them through 
BPHS; however most prefer going to private hospitals since they are superior and can 
give a more accurate diagnosis. 
d. HIV/AIDS Patients 
Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan all target HIV/AIDS patients. 
Resources are much richer, because of the socio-economic concern an outbreak could 
have worldwide. Most of the services given to residents are through harm reduction 
programs which include: pamphlets, free condoms, counseling, needle syringe program, 
healthcare, HIV testing, and other services. While there are funds given to combat the 
disease, there are only two anti-retroviral treatment (ART) services in Kabul and Herat 
that have the capacity to support HIV/AIDS patients. On a national level, the HIV/AIDS 
program is still considered limited because of: “irregular drug supply, low ART coverage, 
drug resistance, low capacity for service delivery, lack of psycho-social support and drop 
 45 
out.”112  At the moment, only 20% of IDUs are covered which a comprehensive package 
of resources.113 Currently in Afghanistan, there are “1.1 needle and syringe programs 
sites per 1000 people who inject drugs.”114 
While all three provinces were proficient in handing out harm reduction 
services, they struggled to provide education simultaneously. Intermedia’s national study 
on HIV/AIDS awareness and found that “only one percent [of participants] were able to 
respond correctly to seven true/false statements about the disease.”115 A Johns Hopkins 
study found similar results when asking participants where they received their HIV/AIDS 
knowledge. Results indicated that 43% knew of HIV/AIDS through the media, 57% 
through friends and doctors, and 0.5% knew through harm reduction services.116 The 
study further recommended prioritizing prevention methods. Only 9% of the individual 
surveyed in Kabul, Mazar, and Herat were aware of the benefits of using condoms 
consistently.117 This result was surprising since even Kabul, with its more advanced 
resources and programs, still struggles to provide preventative education to addicts. The 
good news is that the Johns Hopkins study benefited IDUs who participated in the study. 
If a participant tested positive for HIV in Kabul, Mazar, and Herat, he was referred to the 
WHO in Kabul to get treatment. Currently, Badakhshan and Kandahar do not have this 
type of program. 
e. Mental Health 
To assist citizens who have undergone war-related violence and 
experienced the effects of PTSD, the Afghanistan government announced in 2003 that it 
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would rebuild its national health system. It determined that mental health and disability 
were two of seven crucial initiatives that needed to be implemented in the Basic Package 
of Health Services (BPHS) that are given to Afghanistan residents. The others 5 priorities 
mentioned were: maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, public 
nutrition, communicable diseases, and supply of essential drugs.118 The report moreover 
stated that mental health and disability were “second tier” and would be “phased in at a 
later date.”119  Mental health was included in the BPHS two years later, but the new 
programs were unreachable to the public. For example, the WHO estimated 11 outpatient 
mental health facilities in Afghanistan in 2006.120 Due to unclear guidelines, the BPHS 
was revised in 2009 in hopes that structural changes would improve the quality of 
treatment. While increased policy initiatives have enhanced Afghanistan’s mental health 
programs, there are still three weaknesses that must be addressed: BPHS strategies are 
not being executed in rural regions, the national system does not have standard reporting 
tool, and mental health centers need to be better connected to the ministries.  
My case study research indicates that Kabul is the strongest performer on 
this dimension because it has more resources and the only psychiatric hospital in the 
country. While Kabul is stronger that the other two provinces studied, it should be noted 
that it is weak when compared to other countries. The hospital has “three dozen 
psychiatrists and psychologists [and they] see as many as 160 patients a day at the 
crumbling 26-year-old facility that they are still rebuilding after a bomb six months 
ago.”121 Along with hospital services, Kabul residents had access to Nejat, a non-
governmental organization that specializes in assisting Afghan refugees who have 
experienced psychological trauma from war and social dislocation.122 Even though 
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mental health capacity in Kandahar and Badakhshan is unknown; it is clear that there are 
services available and referral options for addicts. The BPHS clearly outlines 
requirements of health posts, health sub-centers, mobile health teams, basic health 
centers, comprehensive health centers, and district hospitals. The list states that all health 
facilities must provide: mental health awareness, identification of suspected cases, 
community based rehabilitation, and monitoring and follow-up.123  While these services 
are available, there are questions regarding the quality of intervention and ability to create 
a specialized treatment plan for mental health patients. 
Another social barrier in Afghanistan is that residents cannot afford 
psychotropic medicines that would improve their physical and emotional wellbeing. One 
report states that access to free medication is extremely limited (less than 1%); those that 
get medicine end up paying approximately 12–16 percent of their daily wage.124 Current 
documents from the case study additionally showed that there is still a shortage of 
psychologists and psychiatrists in all three provinces despite the alarmingly high rates of 
individuals suffering from PTSD.125 A lack of skilled mental health professionals is 
troubling, because Kabul and Kandahar have extremely high rates of war-related trauma 
and/or domestic violence.126 Provinces with high domestic violence are usually in areas 
which either are influenced by the Taliban (e.g., Kandahar) or in regions that have 
inadequate court systems to stop the oppression of women. By 2014, the MOPH hopes to 
“increase BPHS based mental health service by 75% from 2009 levels” and create a 
program which they can monitor from the provincial level.127  To build capacity, the 
MOPH states that it will do the following: expand referrals systems, provide mental 
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health education in communities, construct functional mental health units in all 
provinces, refine legislation, and improve skill in the workforce.   
f. Women and Children 
While Badakhshan is seen as the weakest of the three provinces, it is 
currently one of six provinces that offer inpatient services for women and children. The 
others being Nangahar, Herat, Ferah, Kabul, and Balkh.128 These inpatient treatment 
clinics have yielded positive results for severely drug dependent mothers, who cannot 
afford to leave their children in daycare or with families for an extended period of time. 
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which is 
located in Kabul, has expanded this concept one step further and incorporated family 
based treatment. This has improved rates of quitting because addicts have more family 
support and do not have to return home to a spouse who is using illicit drugs.129 If women 
or children desire in-patient treatment in Kandahar, they must pay high costs to travel to 
another province. Unfortunately, Afghanistan does not have enough allocated funds to 
target some of the more rural areas, nor have solutions to managing poor health care and 
poverty in the region. 
As far as out-patient treatment, all three case studies have options for 
women. Kandahar has nothing for children, which is unfortunate since Southern 
Afghanistan is known to have a young drug population. Kabul and Kandahar do have 
childcare services available for women who are interested in quitting through out-patient 
treatment. The MOPH is currently working on setting up a similar program in 
Badakhshan. In addition to family services, INL has developed a study which tested the 
effects of second hand smoke in Kabul, Badakhshan, and Nangahar. It found that “Of the 
25 smoking homes, all but two had at least one resident’s hair test positive for opiates. 
Synthetic opiates (hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxycodone) not routinely seen in 
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hair samples were also detected in samples from six users and one 5-year-old child.”130  
This study has been useful in understanding the dangers of smoking opium in front of 
children and is progressive in terms of preventative awareness; however the survey still 
has one more stage until it is complete.  
g. Prisoners 
The reason why Kabul and Kandahar were closely ranked on their ability 
to target populations is because they have similar prison programs in terms of capacity. 
Providing drug demand and harm reduction services to criminals is important; it 
decreases addiction rates,131 reduces small-scale violence, and prevents the spread of 
emerging diseases. Addiction makes it more challenging for prisoners to reintegrate into 
the community. Badakhshan’s prison programs are limited to harm reduction, because its 
facility is much smaller and is not prioritized by the international community. 
Kabul’s Drug Demand and Reduction Action Team (DRAT) manage 450 
addicts in Pul-e Charki prison and technical staff includes “three social workers, one 
psychologist, and one psychiatrist.”132 The Central Prison Department (CPD) additionally 
has 3 physicians and 14 staff members that collaborate occasionally with DRAT to 
improve addiction rates.133 Although Kabul struggles to assist IDUs, it does have a good 
percentage of welfare services that increases the likelihood of prisoners staying off drugs 
once they have quit. For example, the Women for Afghan Women (a local NGO) has 
added a transitional house, named “House of Hope” that gives basic services for females 
leaving prisons in Kabul.134 Having a support group as well as legal aid, vocational 
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training, and literacy classes provides an alternative option in dealing with concerns, 
other than drugs. While Kabul has more after-care programs available for convicts, 
Kandahar has a stronger clinical hospital in its prison. 
Kandahar has approximately 300 addicts and has the second largest 
correctional facility in Afghanistan. Approximately a third of its inmates have reported 
substance abuse issues.135 The prison clinic was constructed in 2010 and has “two 
medical doctors, two social workers, and two healthcare workers.”136 While the facility’s 
primary goal is to deliver basic health services, it also offers both treatment interventions 
and harm reduction services to addicted prisoners. Kandahar’s mix of clinical assistance, 
harm reduction options, and counseling services is a model that should be incorporated in 
all provincial prisons. Although the model is strong, there are still specific administration 
undertakings that must be addressed to ensure sustainability in the future. Even though 
staff are trained and are able to provide a standard health package, the prison clinic lacks 
structure and evidence-based research, especially in its “aftercare” programs which are 
aimed at socially integrating prisoners back into the community.137 There is a huge gap in 
education and awareness when providing harm reduction programs in prisons. In the 
Sarpoza report, only 31 percent of those surveyed had heard of HIV/AIDS.138 NGOs in 
Kandahar assist with after care programs, but they are not directly connected to the 
prisons. 
A July 2012 report recently stated that one of the male rehabilitation 
centers and the prison clinic in Kandahar were being shut down from funding constraints; 
however interviews with MOPH officials suggest otherwise. While the prison clinic has 
weakened, it could still be functioning on a small scale. Even if it still is operational, 
reports like these make experts question whether or not short–term projects will impact 
the effectiveness of drug treatment programs in Kandahar in the future. Can the 
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Afghanistan government fund its drug rehabilitation centers independently? If so, were 
these projected implemented in a way that allows them to be downscaled?   
h. Police officers 
According to the UNODC, “12 to 41 percent of Afghan police recruits at 
Regional Training Centers test positive for drugs.”139 Initiatives have recently been 
developed to assist police officers who are addicted to illegal substances. The main 
objectives of these new political programs are to legitimatize law enforcement and 
improve community awareness regarding drugs and new policies. The case studies 
revealed that Kabul targeted police and had the most established program in Afghanistan. 
To assist police officers in Kabul, Afghanistan created a rehabilitation clinic called The 
Hospital for Interior Ministry Addicts. It is a three to four week advanced program for 
policemen who have failed their mandatory drug test. It is said to have many qualified 
staff (ten medical doctors and two psychologist) and a small percentage of policeman that 
relapse.140 Some of the explanations to why it has been successful are quality 
interventions and high motivations. If policemen do test positive for drugs in the future, 
they will be fired. The hope is that by decreasing addiction rates, the Afghan police force 
will look more legitimate and be less likely to take bribes since they will no longer need 
to afford drugs.141  
While there is mandatory testing required nationwide, it has not fully gone 
into effect at the provincial level. Kandahar had one programs available through the 
Welfare Association for Development of Afghanistan (WADAN), but there was little 
knowledge on whether it was ongoing. According the WADAN website, of the 1485 
Afghan National Police (ANPs) screened, “406 ANPs tested positive for various types of 
drug abuse.”142  Education as well as detoxification and intervention services are offered 
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to those who fail the drug tests. Instead of being fired, police officers can return back to 
the force after they have completed treatment and have shown through drug tests that 
they are substance free. As far as Badakhshan, there was no evidence of police officer 
programs existing in the province. This could be because it receives less funding than 
other at-risk provinces. 
6. Component #6: Criminal Justice System 
My review of national policies and provincial ability to enforce them suggests that 
Kabul has low/medium capacity, Kandahar has low/medium capacity, and Badakhshan 
has low capacity. All three provinces scored poorly in the criminal justice category for 
three reasons: they had fragile communication networks as result of the drug trade, 
experienced high rates of corruption, and they lacked institutional capacity in prisons. 
The reason that Kabul and Kandahar scored equally is because they both have prison 
programs and social workers in their criminal justice system143; yet are both weak and 
suffer from serious corruption. Badakhshan received the lowest capacity because there is 
little data on its programs, and it has reported weak enforcement and few police staff, 
which suggest that it gets fewer resources. To understand Badakhshan’s full potential, 
more research would need to be extrapolated from provincial experts.  
Most of its weak infrastructure can be attributed to the drug trade. The National 
Drug Control Strategies sees the “opium economy as the single greatest challenge to the 
long-term security of development and effective governance.”144 Afghanistan has 
collaborated with international partners (mostly the U.S.) on interdiction and eradication 
as well as on training and mentoring for investigators and justice advisors. According to 
the U.S. State Department, “From March 2010 to March 2011, the [criminal justice task 
force] CJTF Primary Court handled 472 cases involving 649 suspects and more than 
186.5 metric tons of illicit substances.”145 Even though mentoring has increased 
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enforcement, citizens and the international community lack confidence in the central 
government’s ability to manage corruption adequately. The Department of State says that 
enforcement is selective in Afghanistan: “In about one-third of cases from provinces, 
provincial CNPA[Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan] personnel have submitted 
drugs as evidence to the Justice Center but did not arrest the criminal suspect or 
suspects.”146 To improve the illicit drug trade, monitoring and prosecution of high-level 
government officials is needed.  
Corruption has additionally been found problematic when providing alternatives 
to Afghan criminals who have minor drug offenses such as public intoxication or drug 
possession for personal use. Criminals have the option to either pay a huge fine which 
puts them in extreme debt or do an alternative program that includes imprisonment; both 
these initiatives are counterproductive, because high debts, a stressful environment, and 
easy access to drugs in prison will most likely cause an Afghan to relapse.147 These 
alternative programs, which are meant to decrease discrimination and incentivize good 
behaviors, end up hurting the underprivileged that do not have the ability to bounce back.  
There are legal services to assist underprivileged addicts;148 however the quality 
is weak and the process is lengthy, because there is a lack of defense attorneys in 
Afghanistan. The costs of containing prisoners and dealing with the social implications 
after confinement are additionally taxing for both the international community and 
Afghan government. Kabul recently did a study on inmates at Pul-e Charki prison and 
found the following: 
A pilot analysis of the cases of 27 first time offenders (all but one of them 
charged with or convicted of theft or drug related offences) in Pul-e 
Charki prison revealed that 93 percent were poor or very poor, close to 
one third of them employed as daily wage earners prior to imprisonment. 
81 percent of these prisoners did not have legal counsel. Of the sentences 
passed, but most still not confirmed by the Supreme Court, 32 per cent 
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would be eligible for the suspension of their sentences if the provisions of 
the Penal Code were applied and the [Counter Narcotics Law] CNL did 
not prohibit the application of suspension for drug offences.149  
This study illustrates how aligned poverty, drugs, and criminal acts are in 
Afghanistan. Networking within the community, to find existing alternatives for convicts 
is critical for progression in the current justice system. To see improvement in substance 
abuse rates, a community referral system needs to take place after the addict finishes their 
alternative program. The Sarpoza Prison in Kandahar has already begun to improve its 
capacity by working with the Canadian government.150  
7. Component #7: Community Involvement 
My evaluation of recovery capital and its ability to instill collective action within 
the province concludes that Kabul has medium capacity, Kandahar has low/medium, and 
Badakhshan has low capacity. Kabul is stronger than Kandahar, because it has more 
resources; but does not deserve medium/high capacity status, because it has failed to put 
in a proper national referral system. Some of the outreach programs that were mentioned 
in the case studies were: transitional housing, vocational training, disability, legal advice, 
mental health counseling, childcare services, nutritional programs and self-help groups. 
Since childcare services, nutritional programs, legal advice and mental health have been 
thoroughly discussed in component five, they will not be explained in this section. 
The first service is transitional housing; this type of assistance is mostly done by 
local NGOs. Unfortunately, there is little data on how these programs are structured. 
Since mental health is not prioritized, research suggests that transitional housing is 
generalized (less therapy-based) to ensure a large portion of Afghans receive assistance. 
One example of an effective transitional housing program in Afghanistan is the “House 
of Hope.”151 It gives a mix of therapeutic and resource-based assistance to female 
inmates in Kabul so they can “develop life skills and secure employment that will guide 
                                                 
149 UNODC, Afghanistan: Implementing Alternatives to Imprisonment, x. 
150 “The Canadian Government through their Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is undertaking 
construction, infrastructure and training at Sarpoza Prison in Kandahar;” UNODC, Afghanistan: 
Implementing Alternatives to Imprisonment, 55. 
151 UNODC, “UNODC Chief Visits Transition House.”  
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them towards being stable and independent.”152 These types of programs are usually 
difficult to access, because they are so specialized in providing a wide variety of welfare 
services. While transitional housing is crucial for reintegration back into the community, 
it is not prioritized in Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan. All three regions lack 
resources, capabilities, and community networks to do this on a large scale. 
The second service is vocational training; this is being emphasized in all three 
provinces, because employment is one of the primary reasons for drug dependency. The 
MOPH has begun to use unemployment opportunities to promote a new vocational 
program which benefits both the ministry and substance abuse users. Provincial leaders 
are trying to motivate addicts to volunteer at drug treatment programs in hopes that 
building manpower will strengthen awareness within the community. In return, addicts 
can become trained to be a counselor or social worker in the future. This expands 
recovery capital and gives addicts a reason to maintain their ability to stay of drugs. 
Former addicts also have potential to make a strong impression on patients, because they 
can sympathize and relate to similar challenges.  
The third service available for addicts is disability. Although Afghanistan has 
made revisions to the constitution to guarantee rights to disabled individuals, there are no 
documents that can confirm that these programs are fully implement at the provincial 
level. The last time the disability list was updated on the MOPH website was 2004. There 
were 25 organizations for the disabled in Kabul, 7 organizations for the disabled in 
Kandahar, and 4 organizations for the disabled in Badakhshan.153 Poor record keeping 
suggests that the disabled are not getting referred by drug treatment counselors. If 
disabled are able to access services, reports cannot confirm how accurate the data is since 
institutions are constantly changing in Afghanistan. 
The fourth and final option, which is located in all three provinces, is religious 
groups or self-help programs. Many addicts find these groups useful because they can get 
                                                 
152 UNODC, “UNODC Chief Visits Transition House.”  
153 UNDP/UNOPS, “List of Institutions and Organizations Working in the Field of Disability in 
Afghanistan,” last modified August 10, 2004, 
http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ngo_dpo_afghanistan_04.pdf 
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perspectives from other drug users and can create a support system within their 
community. The challenge with self-help groups is that they are difficult to access as well 
as perceived as risky to join because of stigmatization. Drug awareness campaigns that 
explain addiction as a disease could improve participation of community services.  
Todd blames missing information and high relapse rates on a “lack of reliable 
functioning follow-up system.”154 There is a disconnect between welfare services and 
drug rehabilitation centers. Referral systems in Afghanistan are also fragile, because they 
have constant changeover of staff. While new employees may know how to do quality 
interventions, they do not have community networks within the drug treatment sector to 
fully assist their patients. Most community services could be enriched by linking services. 
In conclusion, all provinces have outreach programs; the problem is that they are not 
advertised or prioritized. They all have low capacity, because they are not able to get 
adequate resources from central government. 
8. Component #8: Clinical Governance 
On clinical governance, I evaluate Kabul as having low/medium capacity while 
Kandahar and Badakhshan have low capacity. Drug treatment programs in each province 
lack adequate human resource systems, productivity, and skilled manpower. As 
mentioned in previous sections, recruiting counselors and police is tough, because the 
high risks are not worth the low wages.155 Kabul scored slightly higher for the fact that it 
is mostly urban and had more access to information, staff, and technology. When it 
comes to recruitment, Dr. Hamid Folad states that the MOPH is trying to expand its 
health network and “has took on over 20,000 community health volunteers through the 
integration of drug addiction treatment services into the BPHS and Essential Package of 
Hospital Services (EPHS) during the next five years.”156. He agrees that rural regions are 
more complex because addiction is not as accepted and locations are not as secure or 
                                                 
154 Todd, Naqibullah, and Strathdee “Drug Use and Harm Reduction in Afghanistan,” 4. 
155 Treatment Center confirms that recruitment is difficult and reports that low wages are often given 
to staff months late; U.S. State Department, 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 92. 
156 Dr. Hamid Folad is the Deputy Program Manager for DDR Program at the MOPH 
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financially stable. On a positive note, he states that patients and healthcare workers’ 
rights and confidentiality are respected at the clinical level.  
In the DDR National Policy, the MOPH recognized administrative concerns and 
highlighted the need for a more sophisticated technical reporting tool.157 The report 
further recommends improving clinical governance by developing payroll mechanisms, 
increasing professional trainings, and establishing a counselor certification process that is 
approved by both the MOPH and MCN. If more consistent data is collected in health 
centers and technical systems are enhanced, communication networks can interlink and 
improve recovery capital. This would improve provincial management systems and 
increase participation and follow-up from central governance. It would also improve 
collaboration between the ministries and the international community. 
Even though donor agencies list human resource protocols in their report 
outcomes, they lack administrative guidance in how to move forward. Since they cannot 
monitor Kandahar and Badakhshan consistently, they cannot ensure that new clinical 
governance policies are being enforced at the treatment centers. Little information is 
known in how staff is recruited, how treatment centers do performance reviews, 
corruption within the drug treatment clinics, and how management monitor staff burnout. 
While clinical governance is going to be a challenging undertaking, it will be crucial in 
creating a creditable and sustainable national drug addiction program.    
9. Component #9: Coordination of Services 
My assessment of community involvement and recovery capital in Afghanistan 
concludes that Kabul and Kandahar have low/medium capacity while Badakhshan has 
low capacity. Even though Kabul and Kandahar received the same score, it should be 
noted that Kabul is much stronger in coordinating services at the provincial level. It did 
not receive a medium score because it has failed in implementing a national drug 
treatment referral program. Drug treatment programs have remained fragile in all 
provinces, because Afghanistan has not prioritized addiction rates and provincial 
                                                 
157 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, National Drug Demand 
Reduction Policy 2012–2016, 35. 
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partnerships. Coordination between social welfare, the criminal justice system, and health 
facilities is almost non-existent in most provinces.  
Institutional concerns and accessibility of services would improve if Kabul, 
Kandahar, and Badakhshan had a national/provincial information system from which to 
build multidisciplinary teams. Creating a more complex technical network would ensure 
more accurate data which would decrease doubts regarding key players’ motives. Both 
Badakhshan and Kandahar are known to have inconsistent communication with the 
central government. Kandahar scored slightly higher on the nine components because 
tribal groups have been effective in recruiting volunteers (component 2) and delivering 
services to multiple population groups (component 5) despite having high levels of 
conflict among them. 
Three obstacles prohibit provincial health networks from communicating 
regularly: services in certain locations are difficult to reach, conflict deters progress, and 
donor funds are misinterpreted. Environmental constraints prohibit an effective 
partnership, because it is physically difficult to contact health facilities in rural regions. 
While this is not a problem for Kabul, it is for Badakhshan and Kandahar—limited 
technological capacity and public infrastructure (e.g., paved roads and communication 
networks) makes it problematic for provincial capitals to communicate regularly.  
Badakhshan struggles the most in communication with local and central leaders, 
because it is mountainous and snowy. For example, one addict stressed how difficult it 
was to get to an opium treatment center in Badakhshan; it is “more [than] four hours ride 
on the bumpy road.”158 Another report in Tushkan District states that “lack of new roads 
and bad condition of existing roads has caused mother and infant mortality and it takes 
the residents 24 hours to take their goods and commodities to market by donkeys.”159 
Distance discourages health awareness campaigns and keeps residents from becoming 
                                                 
158 UNODC, “Life in the Mountains of Badakhshan: The Burden of Past Opium Dependence,” last 
modified September 5, 2010, http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/frontpage/2010/September/life-in-the-
mountains-of-badakhshan.html 
159. Tushkan District Development Assembly with the facilitation of NABDP/MRRD and support of 
the District and Provincial Governors, Summary of District Development Pan: Tushkan District, 
Badakhshan Province (Badakhshan: MOPH, 2008), 3. 
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more active in advocating for social concerns. Environmental concerns were addressed 
by a survey in Northern Afghanistan that sought to better understand how primary care 
works in post-conflict communities. After speaking with patients and collecting data from 
different districts, the survey recommended that Northern Afghanistan incorporate more 
mobile clinics to increase local participation.160 Yet drug rehabilitation programs cannot 
be included in mobile clinics. Between low-quality personnel and minimal resources, 
mobile clinics would not be able to provide adequate mental health care. 
The second reason for weak alliances is conflict. Of the three case studies, 
violence has been the most devastating in Kandahar. Warlords and commanders have 
been intervening in drug treatment policies. The central government and international 
community have failed in their promises to reduce the insurgent threat. In fact, insurgent 
attacks have worsened in some regions in Southern Afghanistan as a result of donor 
assistance. In addition to violence, poverty and corruption from the drug trade have 
implanted doubts regarding outsider’s intentions. There are concerns from residents that 
tribal leaders, provincial government officials, and donors may be strategizing for their 
own financial gain, instead of doing what is best for the region. Provincial leaders in 
Kandahar are frustrated because they feel their suggestions regarding social grievances 
are not being taken into account. Suspicions in partnerships keep both sides from 
reaching a consensus; this is noticeable in culturally sensitive issues like harm reduction 
services. Even though recovery capital is fairly strong in Kandahar, there is concern that 
social services will weaken if mistrust continues, particularly if donors decide to leave.   
The third reason for a decline in partnerships has to do with funding constraints, 
inaccurate data, and overrepresentation of donor resources at the local and national level. 
As mentioned in the case studies, it is hard to determine what treatment centers are still 
open for business. Addiction statistics are constantly changing and current reports seem 
to show a downward trend in resources, even though significantly more reports are being 
written on the impacts of drug addiction in Afghanistan. Misconstrued data has 
additionally made it impossible to evaluate drug treatment capabilities. Statistics are 
                                                 
160 Morikawa et al., “Primary Care in Post-Conflict Rural Northern Afghanistan,” Public Health 125, 
no. 1 (2011): 55. 
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missing from private organizations, non-profits, and smaller-scale clinics. One 
explanation is that funds were dispensed inefficiently so managers decided to transfer 
responsibilities or consolidate treatment. If this is the case, then changes in the data may 
not necessarily be a bad thing—a decrease in centers is only negative if there is also a 
decrease in quality.   
The other explanation is that these treatment centers never existed at all and that 
donors or the Afghan government used the funds to benefit themselves. For example, 
short term projects may have been obligated from donors without any follow-through. 
Either way, it is almost impossible to evaluate data through services rendered because 
Afghanistan is constantly changing in its socio-economic and political status. This 
situation could be improved by more intense collaboration during the assessment. Short-
term programs have been useful in assisting the underprivileged quickly and bringing 
awareness, but have unfortunately decreased the participatory response needed to 
improve recovery capital for drug addicts. To improve partnerships in all three provinces, 
maintenance and follow-through should be prioritized. 
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IV. CASE STUDY CONTEXTUALIZATION 
This chapter assesses geographical, political, economic, and cultural barriers to 
determine how individual-level variables impact recovery capital in Kabul, Kandahar and 
Badakhshan. Each case study begins by providing a comprehensive background that 
describes the variation between drug treatment centers in each region. It contains insights 
as to why cultural and geographical nuances either promote or suppress a positive 
response. The literature review questions posed in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 are then 
extrapolated to create an empirical framework to assess provincial capability and 
recovery capital. Lastly, the case studies highlight why stronger economic/political 
policies and psychological programs produce higher quality drug treatment programs. 
The expectation is that more developed socio economic regions, like Kabul, will have 
stronger community assistance networks which will decrease an addict’s desire to use 
poppy as a way of survival. Regions like Kandahar and Badakhshan will have lower 
quality of drug treatment programs; because they receive less donors assistance, socio-




A. CASE STUDY- KABUL PROVINCE 
Table 7.   Kabul: Assessment of Structural Dimensions161 
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161 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial 
Briefs, 27–28; UNODC Statistics and Surveys Section, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by 
the Victims (Kabul: UNODC, 2010), 29–30.  
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1. Provincial Strengths 
This Kabul case study will provide political and economic background to 
questions asked in the literature review (Table 7), pinpoint barriers to effectiveness, and 
give explanations to why Kabul has the strongest drug treatment programs in 
Afghanistan. Most of Kabul’s increased institutional and technical capacity can be 
attributed to four reasons: its status as the nation’s capital, its more established political 
and economic markets, its linkage to local and international contributors, and its evidence 
based research.  
The reason why its location is more advanced is because it is the primary place in 
the country where political change originates. It is where the largest portion of senior 
government and international officials reside, where policies are established, and where 
new economic strategies are initiated. Its more advanced urban environment has the 
potential to give residents a sense of hope for a better lifestyle, and in effect, deters 
residents from using illegal substances as a coping mechanism. In addition, the 
competitive atmosphere and comfortable living conditions (e.g., clean water and 
electricity)162 reduce the likelihood that educated residents in psychology, policy, or the 
health field will move to another region in Afghanistan for employment. Having long-
term staff in Kabul has been beneficial in developing a more enriched referral system 
(when compared to other provinces), providing cultural perspective, and having more 
collective action when creating individualized plans for special populations. 
The second reason for Kabul’s enhanced capabilities has to do with its 
connections to political and economic networks. Its unique position has given Kabul a 
large advantage when implementing policies and developing markets. Program directors 
have been able to receive a quick response from central government, advocate for 
resources, and play a more participatory role in the reconstruction process. The economy 
                                                 
162 Living conditions has improved significantly; Kabul residents who live in urban areas have access 
to electricity 24 hours a day as a result of recent international efforts to partner with Uzbekistan; IEEE 
Global History Network, “Electricity Supply in Afghanistan,” last modified 2012, 
http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/Electricity_Supply_in_Afghanistan 
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in Kabul is quite diverse and strong (when compared to other provinces),163 and has been 
influential in deterring residents from being employed in the illicit drug industry. While 
slight increases in poppy production are expected, the UNODC states that security is 
strong in Kabul and the province’s role in cultivation is insignificant, since it has been 
restricted to Surobi district.164  
 The third explanation for its progression is that Kabul has aligned with stronger 
networks to enrich its drug treatment programs. The MOPH and the MCN have studied 
obstacles that prohibit addicts from seeking help in Kabul and have been instrumental in 
the transformation of a more community based approach. Less time and money is spent 
when communication gaps are addressed. Since the majority of ministry officials are 
based in the capital, they can partner psychologists and academics in Kabul with 
international donors. These international connections give Kabul experts an advantage 
when doing business, because they already have a relationship and can have 
conversations about expectations prior to submitting research proposals; for example, the 
MOPH partnered with donors to improve the refugee population in Kabul. Resources 
may have not been so rich if addiction around the “Pul-sokhta” Bridge and the Old 
Russian Cultural Center were not so heavily advertised to the international community. 
Kabul’s fourth reason for being seen as the most advanced in Afghanistan can be 
attributed to its research capabilities which have enhanced drug treatment programs 
ability to provide more quality interventions. Some of the fields that do drug treatment 
studies are: psychology, drug trafficking, human rights, and HIV/AIDS.165 Evidence-
based interventions increase success rates, provide psychological insights into 
counteracting substance abuse in Kabul, and evaluate target populations. Results are 
oftentimes briefed in international forums to ensure there is consensus on best ways to 
move forward. Donors prefer conducting evidence-based research in Kabul, because 
                                                 
163 Trade and services provide over half of all household incomes while manufacturing, agriculture, 
and public administration/government account for a substantial percentage of other household salaries; 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial Briefs, 28.  
164 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment for the Central, Eastern, 
Southern and Wester Regions (Kabul: UNODC and MCN, 2011), 19.  
165 U.S. State Department, “Demand Reduction Program: Afghanistan.”  
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there is advanced technology, experts are likely to speak English, it is a neutral/somewhat 
safe location, and researchers can request assistance from the ministries if problems arise. 
The perspective that Kabul is the “research hub” was reinforced when reviewing articles 
on substance abuse in Afghanistan; studies that promoted preventative health and drug 
treatment referenced Kabul the most out of any other province. In addition to 
publications, Kabul was found to have an abundance of harm reduction, drug treatment, 
and welfare services when compared to other provinces in Afghanistan. This is primarily 
because of donor influence within Kabul and its high percentage of educated experts who 
can advocate for the poor.166  
2. Provincial Weaknesses 
While Kabul’s drug treatment capabilities are more advanced than other Afghan 
provinces, it should be noted that its research capacity is still limited when paralleled to 
other developing countries. There are two explanations for Kabul’s inadequacies: its 
corruption restricts the poor from advocating and accessing services and its ongoing 
violence prohibits national economic advancement. The first and most concerning issue 
for Kabul residents is corruption. Policy constraints and dishonesty within government 
have created friction between citizens and central authority. One national study found 
that over 60% of individual’s perceived Kabul province as having the worst corruption in 
Afghanistan.167 Regulations in Kabul are weak, because the insurgent movement uses 
corruption in Afghanistan as a funding and propaganda source.  
Landler says that corruption is one of the best ways to recruit new Taliban 
members, because it reinforces the need for a more legitimate government.168 Many 
residents have lost faith in Karzai’s leadership, because they feel his institutions are 
structured to benefit the rich. This has been seen when developing drug treatment 
programs throughout Afghanistan; there are very few avenues for the underprivileged. 
                                                 
166 The Literacy rate age 16 and older is 46.8 percent in Kabul, compared to the 25.0 percent national 
average; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial 
Briefs, 28. 
167 UNODC Statistics and Surveys Section, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery, 29–30. 
168 Mark Landler, “Envoy Says Corruption Helps Taliban Win Recruits,” The New York Times, July 
28, 2010, 1. 
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While there are a few services, they are difficult to access, because central government 
has failed to create a nation drug referral system. Most addicts express a need for 
psychological and economic support, but feel it is impossible to access. The central 
government has introduced strong ideas, but they lack follow-through, are not always 
thought out, and are inconsistent. 
 While policies were created with good intentions, programs have backfired. A 
great example of this was shown when evaluating the criminal justice section; alternative 
prison programs were found to be counterproductive and put prisoners in large debts. 
While funds have been expended to improve addiction rates in Kabul, the central 
government still lacks administrative capacity to ensure that resources are given 
transparently to drug treatment programs.  
While the U.S. has collaborated closely with Karzai to improve accountability and 
transparency, there are concerns that his “reluctance to prosecute officials for corruption, 
particularly those related to him or aligned with him politically,” could prohibit 
implementation of anti-corruption policies.169 For example, the collapse of the Kabul 
Bank is an excellent illustration of how high profile or “well connected Afghans have 
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit.”170 Karzai’s 
actions to selectively prosecute officials are weakening Afghanistan’s justice system. 
While international organizations are aware of corruption concerns, it is difficult for them 
to assist, because Afghan criminals are well protected by high-ranked officials. 
Underprivileged residents, who are aware of the “Malign Actor Networks,” refuse to 
testify, because their confession could cause them to be targeted.171 The international 
community cannot improve the justice system without more participatory efforts from 
central government.  
                                                 
169 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 41.  
170 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, 46. 
171 Mathew Rosenberg, “‘Malign’ Afghans Targeted,” The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2012, 
1. 
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The second reason that Kabul struggles to improve capacity in drug treatment 
programs is that violence deters provincial progress. Part of this concern is stemmed from 
corruption because fraudulent acts delegitimize Kabul’s police force and make it more 
difficult to recruit officers. Even though Kabul is seen as the safest region for foreigners 
in Afghanistan, it still experiences conflict on a continuous basis. For example, in 2010, 
Kabul officials reported “110 antigovernment attacks from January to September.”172 In 
addition to terrorism, over-populated areas have become difficult to enforce; and as a 
result, there has been an increase in individual assaults, kidnappings, and robberies in 
Kabul.173 Reoccurring violence has instilled scarce confidence in law enforcement 
capabilities and uncertainty in Afghanistan’s economic future. The international 
community would prefer to invest in countries which are less risky, more secure, 
transparent, and profitable. The state of violence in Kabul is especially concerning as 
international troops begin to leave Afghanistan. Residents worry that businesses will 
decline as donors develop elsewhere. One businessman in Kabul said that “his business is 
already drying up and that in approximately two years he will close up shop and leave 
Afghanistan.”174 
  
                                                 
172 This article was released after a NATO representative stated that Kabul is probably safer than New 
York or London; Ben Arnoldy, “Kabul ‘safer’ for kids than London or New York, says NATO.” The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 2010, 2. 
173 Chris Sands, “Population Growth Overwhelms Kabul,” The National, August 30, 2008: 1. 
174 Steven Zyck, Opium Poppies & the Afghan Economy (Civil-Military Fusion Centre: Afghanistan 
in Transition, 2012), 1. 
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B. CASE STUDY- KANDAHAR 
Table 8.   Kandahar: Assessment of Structural Dimensions175 
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1. Provincial Strengths 
This case study evaluates Kandahar’s drug treatment capacity through the 
literature review questions above, explains why the region is stronger than Badakhshan 
province in providing services to addicts, and identifies how the international community 
and the central government can contribute in developing addiction programs in an 
insecure environment. It is a unique province to study, because the region is known to be 
involved in the drug trade; nevertheless there seems to be heavy stigmatization of drug 
users. It ability to overcome its instability and to be seen as one of the stronger drug 
treatment provinces is an achievement in its own. Its strengths can be attributed to three 
reasons: high donor funds, increased efforts to combat counter narcotics, and 
participation from tribal networks.  
The first reason that Kandahar is stronger than Badakhshan is that it receives 
heavy donor assistance from the international community. Kandahar has used these funds 
to create welfare service programs for substance abuse users that have been proven 
constructive in increasing provincial living conditions. In fact, when evaluating the three 
case studies, research found that Kandahar had the lowest unemployment and poverty 
rate.176 While this statistic is promising, household stability should be further questioned 
to understand the significance of this measurement. While it has lower poverty rates than 
Kabul, there are more households in Kandahar which reported economic hardship.177 
This could mean two things: that Kabul’s statistics are skewed because of their high 
refugee population or that the majority of households are receiving inconsistent income 
through the illicit drug industry and while they are less poor overall, Kandahar’s residents 
receive less assistance when they need it. While the measurements given cannot provide 
                                                 
176 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial 
Briefs, 31. 
177 The 2005 NRVA reports that 38% never, 22% rarely (1–3 times a year), 33% sometimes (3–6 
times a year) 4% often (few times a month) and 3 percent mostly (happens a lot) have trouble satisfying 
food needs; The World Programme, “Provincial Profile,” last modified 2012, 
http://www.foodsecurityatlas.org/afg/country/provincial-Profile; (22.8% poverty rate compared to 35.8 
national average) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank. Afghanistan 
Provincial Briefs, 29  
 70 
accurate insight, Kandahar’s should be acknowledged for its improvement in getting 
services to the underprivileged. 
The second explanation for improvements in Kandahar’s drug treatment programs 
is that it has created economic incentives to avoid the drug industry. While addiction 
rates are still extremely high, new economic opportunities have made residents less 
reliant on corrupt institutions which should decreased their risk of experimenting with 
drugs in the future. Recent data suggest that there has been a moderate decline in opium 
cultivation in Kandahar due to less violence, fear of eradication, campaigning, and 
development programs.178 International donors have changed their tactics and put 
substantial funds towards counter-narcotics while simultaneously diversifying markets. 
Current statistics show that Kandahar has begun to economically diversify; however, 
employment is still predominantly in two sectors.179 The hope is that continued resources 
and employment opportunities in Kandahar will improve security, and in effect, reduce 
anti-government ties in the future. Market growth in Kandahar will likely depend on its 
ability to decrease the insurgency, which is somewhat concerning considering that 
Southern Afghanistan is known for its Taliban involvement and high casualty rates. 
Strong tribal groups are the third and final explanation for why Kandahar is 
stronger than Badakhshan. Influential leaders have improved communication systems and 
connected services within the drug treatment community. While these complex tribal 
networks do not necessarily approve of central government, they do have the same goal 
in combatting drug addiction. The majority of citizens in Kandahar speaks Pashto and 
belongs to the following five tribal groups: Popalzai, Barakzai, Alkozai, Noorzai, and 
Lezai. Dupree states that there are six socio-cultural themes that can be seen in tribes in 
Afghanistan: multilingualism, illiteracy, agriculture and pastoral characteristics, lack of 
 
                                                 
178 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment, 1. 
179 The 2007–2008 NRVA report has the top five sources of income being agriculture (45.3%), 
Manufacturing/Construction/Mining/Quarrying (10.6%), Services (42.5%), and Public 
Administration/Government (1.6%); Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World 
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social mobility, limited social exposure, and dominance of kinship.180 Participation from 
tribal leaders has been beneficial in helping donors fully comprehend the complexity of 
the province. Their inputs have ensured that new programs maintain a traditional 
structure while concurrently adhering to the social themes of residents. Since tribal 
leaders have such deeply aligned ties, they have been instrumental in: drug awareness and 
prevention campaigns, managing culturally sensitive issues, recruiting community 
volunteers, and motivating individuals to seek treatment. Continued cooperation from 
powerful community leaders could significantly improve the capacity of drug treatment 
programs in the future.   
2. Provincial Weaknesses 
This section assesses Kandahar’s drug treatment programs to understand why its 
infrastructure is still weak despite receiving such strong donor assistance. It describes 
political and economic barriers, explains community perceptions, and gives guidance on 
lessons learned. There are five explanations to why Kandahar is not as strong as Kabul: 
its insecurity is prioritized over development, its weak law enforcement instills 
corruption, its low human capital reduces capabilities, its complex government system 
creates social stigmatization, and its poor evaluation process encourages more short-term 
thinking. 
The first reason why Kandahar has weak drug treatment capacity is that it is a 
geographically unstable region. Southern Afghanistan is closely aligned with the Taliban, 
is highly involved in the illicit drug industry, and is seen as a safe haven for Anti-
Government Forces (AGF).181 Security has had to be prioritized over all other efforts. 
For example, one Kandahar security report stated that “in the first four months of 2010, 
 
                                                 
180 Joan Sullivan-Owomoyela and Laura Brannelly, Promoting Participation: Community 
Contributions to Education in Conflict Situations (Reading, UK: UNESCO, 2009), 54.  
181 Sophia Woodcock, Socio-Economic and Psychological Assessment of fluctuation and Variations 
of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Key Provinces in Afghanistan: Balkh, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Central 
Provinces (Kabul: UNODC, 2006), 51.  
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there were at least 64 assassinations.”182 The Taliban supports the drug industry, because 
it is a major source of income for the insurgency movement and reinforces the argument 
that a more legitimate power is needed in central governance. Woodcock describes the 
mentality towards Taliban initiatives as, “forcefully advocating the concept that Pashtuns 
should be reinstated as the main rulers of Afghanistan. They are motivated by short term 
considerations, believing that force can be applied to any future problems that they have 
not conceptualized.”183 Drug trafficking, opium cultivation, and heroin processing 
laboratories have halted reconstruction in Kandahar, because they have exasperated 
violence, instilled corruption, and delegitimized efforts by the international community. 
The second challenge is that Kandahar lacks police officers to deter conflict and a 
strong justice system to tackle legal disputes.184 The Afghan National Police (ANP) force 
has been ineffective and incapable of managing the insurgency. Experts like Forsberg 
blame this on corruption. He suggests that local powerbrokers deliberately weakened or 
manipulated the police force for political and financial gain.185 While corruption is a 
problem in all three case studies, it has been particularly problematic in Kandahar 
because it has strengthened the resistance. Problems will continue to persist as long as 
financial infrastructure is constructed in a way which favors the drug industry. Recent 
efforts to legitimize law enforcement have been somewhat effective; however perceptions 
will remain if police recruitment rates are not improved and policies not enforced. 
The third reason that Kandahar struggles to provide its citizen’s resources is 
poverty. Poverty increases addictions rates and reduces human capital in the region. 
While opium production is contrary to Islam beliefs, many residents perceive the drug 
industry as a survival tactic. It is difficult for farmers to switch to a more legitimate crop 
                                                 
182 Anand Gopal, The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar (Washington, DC: 
New America Foundation, 2010), 38.  
183 Woodcock, Socio-Economic and Psychological Assessment, 8 
184 Paraag Shukla, Battlefield Update: Task Force dreadnaught in Maiwand District, Kandahar 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2012), 3.   
185 Forsberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” 47. 
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when they see poppy as a “more attractive option for the household,” explains McCoy.186 
While participating in the drug trade can be profitable, it can also be risky. Drug 
traffickers and opium farmers in Kandahar are more vulnerable to addiction, because they 
are more likely to experience poverty, unemployment, violence, or loss of family 
members. Recent data suggests that there are approximately 100,000 addicts in Kandahar 
province alone.187  
Even though the international community has taken steps to diversify economic 
markets and decrease poverty, Kandahar has a long way to go before it can provide drug 
treatment and social services to all of its citizens. More long-term planning needs to be 
done to ensure drug treatment infrastructure is more sustainable. For example, Kandahar 
still has extremely low literacy rates,188 which has reduced the amount of educated 
counselors and social workers and weakened specialized care. Those who are educated 
often leave because of low wages and unsafe conditions. Its low rates are partly due to 
tribal influence, since illiteracy is one of the six socio-cultural themes present in most 
groups. More communications with tribal leaders on this specific issue could be 
beneficial in the future. 
Kandahar’s fourth weakness is that donors and central government have a fragile 
relationship with key provincial leaders. While tribal groups have been beneficial in 
expanding community services, they are only cooperative on initiatives which they find 
are important. A great example of this can be seen with harm reduction services; they are 
strong in their beliefs that programs should remain abstinence-based. Tribal networks 
have also been selective in clans which they assist. Partnerships between clans are 
resilient, because “tribal politics [are] deeply entwined with governance.”189 Forsberg 
 
                                                 
186 Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 505. 
187 Relief Web, “Afghanistan: Despite Counter-Narcotics Efforts, Number of Drug Addicts still High 
in Kandahar,” last modified June 27, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/despite-counter-narcotics-
efforts-number-drug-addicts-still-high-kandahar. 
188 Literacy rate is extremely poor at 7.3%; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy 
and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial Briefs, 30. 
189 Gopal, The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar, 5. 
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compares them to mafia networks, where leaders maintain power and influence by 
organizing their cartels along tribal lines.190 While collaboration with tribal networks is 
vital to drug treatment success, program leaders should be mindful when applying new 
processes. 
The fifth challenge is that instability in Kandahar and negative attitudes toward 
central government has made it difficult for outsiders to play an active role in 
constructing drug treatment programs. Communication between donors, the ministries, 
and provincial leaders could be improved by developing a national referral system. 
Kandahar needs to come up with a plan to ensure that drug treatment continues as donors 
become less interested in the region. There are serious concerns, both locally and 
worldwide, that insurgent attacks will increase once international troops depart 
Afghanistan. This sense of hopelessness could potentially drive more residents to drug 
addiction and made it difficult to change residents’ mentality towards the international 
community. 
  
                                                 
190 Forsberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” 11.  
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C. CASE STUDY- BADAKHSHAN 
Table 9.   Badakhshan: Assessment of Structural Dimensions191 
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1. Provincial Strengths 
While Badakhshan is noticeably weaker than the other two provinces, it does have 
significantly more resources for addicts than other Afghan regions. These three provinces 
were specifically chosen for their strengths, because there had to be enough research 
available and infrastructure in place to fully grasp each province’s drug treatment 
capability. Badakhshan should receive positive acknowledgment for the fact that it has 
been proactive and had the foresight to see that its residents were more susceptible to 
drug use. The province should be recognized for two strengths, in particular: its ability to 
maintain a relatively safe region and to target special populations despite such small 
donor funds. While Badakhshan has experienced much corruption and illicit drug 
trafficking, it has been able to maintain low opium cultivation and has had few insurgent 
attacks. In addition, it should be commended for its commitment to prioritizing women 
and children in its drug treatment programs. There are few provinces that have targeted 
this special population, which shows that the region is trying to be more progressive 
while still maintaining the family-based approach that is important to its residents. It also 
has potential to continue its economic diversification through tourism, agriculture, and its 
large coal and mineral reserves. If Badakhshan is able to maintain this stability, access 
more donor funds, and develop a more community-based approach in the health and 
social welfare sector, it may see economic progress and less addiction rates in the future.  
2. Provincial Weaknesses 
This section examines drug treatment centers, compares the results of the 
literature review questions above, and explains why Badakhshan lacks capacity in its 
programs despite the fact that it is located in a relatively stable region. There are four 
reasons to why Badakhshan is perceived as the weakest: decreased human capital 
prohibits economic growth, its geographic position is complex, corruption has 
illegitimatized its justice system, and weak infrastructure decreases networking 
capabilities. While these problems are all concerning, this thesis recommends that 
Badakhshan put poverty at the forefront because it has the most potential for creating 
constructive change. The other obstacles are vital in building provincial capacity; 
 77 
however economically assisting impoverished citizens is the one solution that is linked to 
all of the obstacles mentioned above.  
The first explanation for Badakhshan’s lower level of capacity is its decrease in 
human capital: extreme poverty prevents residents from taking a more active leadership 
role in the community. Even though the province has economic potential, in terms of 
agriculture and the trade industry, most residents find it difficult to survive off of their 
household income.192 In fact, two thirds of citizens have taken on debt because they did 
not have sufficient salary to pay for food.193 In addition, impoverished residents have 
reported difficulty in accessing clean water, healthcare, and electricity. Such severe 
poverty has created uncertainty throughout the region and made it difficult for provincial 
leaders to think in the long term. Individuals oftentimes choose working over education, 
because it ensures survival. Those who are educated normally move to the capital where 
they can receive a larger income and live a more comfortable lifestyle. Lower education 
rates mean194 that there are fewer professionals in the province that are capable of 
conducting evidence based drug treatment, enforcing counternarcotic policies, and 
providing basic medical care.  
The lack of human capital has also deterred more diverse economic infrastructure. 
While international funds have been given to diversify the region and strengthen markets, 
they have not been successful in doing so. Badakhshan has had to rely on foreign 
agencies, which are inconsistent in providing healthcare and welfare services. 
International organizations have expanded schools, electricity, and roads; however, more 
is required to fill such an extreme poverty gap and donors are finding that their efforts are 
unsustainable without central governments cooperation. As foreigners decrease their 
presences, government will need to take a more active role in providing assistance. If 
                                                 
192 “Around half the households in the province (48%) report having problems satisfying their food 
needs at least 3 – 6 times a year, and a further quarter of households (27%) face this problem up to three 
times a year;” The World Programme, “Provincial Profile.” 
193 In 2005, 24% of the population of Badakhshan Province received allocations of food aid. In 
addition, of the 36% of households who reported taking out loans around two thirds (67%) said that the 
main use of their largest loan was to buy food. A further 11% used the money to cover expenses for health 
emergencies;” The World Programme, “Provincial Profile.” 
194 The literacy rate for individuals 16 years and above is currently at 26.5 percent; Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy and World Bank, Afghanistan Provincial Briefs, 2. 
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they do not, residents may take more risky employment to ensure survival. Extreme 
poverty has incentivized many farmers to revert back to the illicit drug industry. Northern 
Afghanistan previously had an “opium free status,” but recent data suggests that there 
will be an increase in the next coming year,195 which could instill conflict in the future. 
Residents are frustrated with donors and central government because they have failed to 
meet the promise of “greater levels of development funding” if they discontinued opium 
cultivation.196  
Badakhshan’s third reason for inefficiencies can be attributed to its geographical 
location. Northern Afghanistan has struggled to develop infrastructure, because “the ban 
on opium cultivation has coincided with prolonged and repeat droughts.”197 With its high 
mountain ranges (Hindu Kush and Pamir) and its proximity to the border, the northeast 
region is seen as one of the main transit routes for opium and heroin being trafficked to 
Central Asia, Europe, and Russia. Badakhshan and Nangarhar are used as a pit stop for 
traffickers, because they prefer to refine morphine base to heroin before crossing the 
border.198 Once in Tajikistan, smugglers trade with the Russian Mafia for arms—because 
they can thereby double their profits when they return back to Afghanistan.199 Being near 
the border additionally increases resident’s chances of becoming addicted, because they 
are more likely to be around or know someone who is involved in the drug trade. 
Residents are more at risk to be exposed to a variety of potent and addictive drugs from 
neighboring countries. This is a threat because these drugs have the potential to promote 
an infectious outbreak if not managed correctly. This being said, their unique position 
(drug traffickers, heroin laboratories, and high addiction rates) has made drug treatment 
                                                 
195 UNODC, “UNODC Chief Visits Northern Afghan Province of Badakhshan,” last modified May 
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processing 1 ton of heroin a year; UNODC, Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central 
Asia: A Threat Assessment (UNODC, 2012), 10.  




programs more complex to manage. In effect, Badakhshan has had to create community 
programs that will be beneficial to both Afghan and Tajikistan addicts, since so many 
smugglers and migrants cross the border.  
The fourth reason for weaker provincial drug treatment programs is corruption, 
which is amplified because of proximity to the border. As in the previous case studies, 
corruption decreases allocated funds to the poor and prohibits drug policies from being 
initiated. Even though government officials in Badakhshan and Tajikistan publicly state 
that they prefer to not partner with insurgent groups, there are some that are financially 
swayed by the huge profits.200 Tensions especially occur between government and the 
national border police when trying to carry out eradication and interdiction.201 This 
resistance is mostly due to both sides blaming each other for not responding adequately to 
the smuggling networks. The friction is preventing both sides from tackling the issue in a 
collaborative manner. The indecisiveness of both countries has caused a drift between 
their citizens and justice systems. These bad perceptions have further increased border 
security problems within the region and made recruitment of the police force challenging. 
For example, low wages and high casualty rates make it difficult to convince residents to 
become policemen; those who are hired repeatedly fail to show up for work.202  
Residents have begun to see police and justice system as illegitimate, because 
both have failed in enforcing offenses that include drug trafficking and corruption. 
Instead of using judicial courts, many have turned to a more local approach to solve 
disputes because it is less expense, timely, and more dependable. As an alternative, they 
request mediators, who are “elected members of provincial council… [and] are more 
familiar with local problems and the parties involved than judges and governors who are 
                                                 
200 “Unlike in southern Afghanistan, Taliban and other Anti-Government Elements (AGE) are 
apparently not taxing the opium trade with any regularity in northern Afghanistan. There are, however, 
specific locations in northern Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan where AGE appear to be partially funding 
their operations through the drug economy, and in turn protect it from interdiction;” UNODC, Opiate 
Flows Through Northern Afghanistan, 7.  
201 Cole Hansen, Christian Dennys, and Idrees Zaman, Conflict Analysis: Baharak District, 
Badakhshan Province (Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 2009), 8. 
202 Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and International Law, Annex D: Support to Provincial 
Governance: Provincial Needs Assessment Badakhshan (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Law and International Law, 2009), 6. 
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appointed from Kabul.”203 Other residents have decided to turn to more informal groups, 
such as street leaders, to receive justice which is concerning because it could lead to more 
violence in the future.204 While the international community has put money towards 
interdiction efforts, they have struggled to respond quickly because global trafficking is 
so complex. Recently, Afghanistan, Russia, and U.S. agencies succeeded in destroying 
six heroin labs in Badakhshan province and confiscating “180 kg of heroin, 1,500 kg of 
morphine, and 1,200 kg of opium during the raids.”205 Stronger enforcement along with 
improving public support of government is crucial to instilling a more collaborative 
community approach when developing drug policies for citizens.  
The last explanation for why Badakhshan is seen as the weakest of the three 
provinces is that it lacks network capability and recovery capital. Since Badakhshan is 
seen as relatively stable, when compared to other countries, it has received less monetary 
support from the international community. As a result, addiction programs are not 
prioritized, because there are other more life-threating issues that must be addressed in 
Afghanistan. This frustrates residents, because they feel their good behavior is preventing 
them from getting the assistance they need. While the international community has tried 
to developed financial incentives for Badakhshan, they have been unsuccessful in 
reaching the entire population, which is large and impoverished. Donors have also 
struggled to collaborate closely with local government to build a community health 
network; this is mostly due to a lack of resources in the region.  
Furthermore, there is no referral system to assist addicts which has increased 
inefficiencies. The rough terrain and poverty in the region has become a major hindrance 
in communications. While treatment may be free for addicts, many cannot afford the 
travel. Addicts in rural areas have even fewer social workers who could direct them to 
specialized welfare services. Drug treatment programs could be enriched by connecting 
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provincial education and health awareness campaigns. Collaboration could additionally 
be improved at the national level by expanding infrastructure (e.g., roads and technology) 
so that they could be more involved in the monitoring process.    
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V. CONCLUDING POINTS 
A. CONNECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC MARKETS TO DRUG 
TREATMENT  
This thesis has presented a structured, comparative assessment of drug treatment 
quality in three Afghan provinces along with detailed case studies contextualizing and 
explaining these outcomes on the basis of social, political, economic, and psychological 
factors. On this basis, this thesis has confirmed that there is a connection between the 
drug industry, poverty, and addiction. Clinical studies have found that the majority of 
addicts use drugs because of depression and unemployment.206 To prevent a drug 
addiction spiral from occurring, Afghanistan needs to start investing in its population. In 
short, Afghanistan residents desire hope in the future so that they do not have to turn to 
drugs to mask the pain. While providing social alternatives seems like a simple solution 
to the addiction problem, the provincial case studies found that it was an extremely 
difficult task to undertake.   
The biggest challenge found in all the three case studies was corruption associated 
with the drug industry. Corruption has delegitimized local institutions and made it 
difficult for residents to trust provincial leaders, central government, and donor 
intentions. This has been particularly troubling in Kandahar province; where some tribal 
ties are still closely connected to the Taliban. Negative perceptions can be improved by 
increasing social welfare programs. While this takes time, the National Solidarity 
Program has already seen significant progress in using development to change 
perceptions.207 Success was also confirmed through the case studies—with the most 
influential provinces already having social networks in place prior to tackling drug 
addiction, along with programs that targeted individual well-being.  
                                                 
206 Stanekzai et al., “Baseline Assessment of Community Knowledge,” 451. 
207 “We find that villagers residing in communities which have received projects are more likely to 
hold positive perceptions of their economic situation and exhibit positive attitudes towards the 
government”; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds Through Development,” 2.  
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Dealing with corruption at the national level is more challenging, because it 
requires collaboration with central government. All three of the case studies mentioned 
that weak law enforcement and the illicit drug industry prohibited treatment programs 
from being effective. In some cases, like the national alternative prison program, drug 
policies worsened the situation and made addicts further reliant on substances. An 
enhanced marketplace would deter some of the repercussions from eradication and 
interdiction methods and reduce the chance of residents returning back to the drug 
industry for support. More connections in civil society would additionally increase 
communication between sectors which is necessary to increase transparency at the 
national level.  
Anti-corruption efforts could also be improved by creating a portal that holds 
essential data. After reviewing the case studies, it was apparent that reporting procedures 
were lacking and that data was inaccurate. Many of the reports had not been updated for 
two to three years on the MOPH website. Having a national technical information system 
that could connect health, welfare, and criminal justice sectors together would be 
extremely useful in enhancing transparency. A more advanced system would help donors 
understand provincial capacity as well as ensure that central government is participatory 
in monitoring and evaluation. Relationships would improve by an information system, 
because actors involved would understand each other’s intentions. 
The case studies additionally identified the need to improve human resources and 
administrative concerns within drug treatment programs. The section on clinical 
governance showed that there was a huge gap in expertise in the mental health field. 
Kabul is more advanced because it has more educated residents who are active in 
advocating for addicts and researching provincial needs. Since drug treatment is linked 
with unemployment, it is the ideal mechanism to advocate for improving human capital. 
When improving the workforce, provinces should seek counsel from tribal groups. In the 
case study research, they were seen as beneficial in standardizing procedures and 
informing residents of new programs. Since tribal networks have the same objective in 
decreasing addiction rates, they may have suggestions for making programs more 
culturally appropriate. This is important, because literacy is not prioritized in most clans. 
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In addition, they may have recommendations on how to enforce and incorporate 
governance policies into their tribal programs. 
These case studies have reinforced the notion that targeting drug addiction along 
with simultaneously strengthening economic markets and enhancing opportunities for 
individuals is the best option to break the vicious drug cycle in Afghanistan. It is the best 
way to counteract warlords, because they cannot recruit drug traffickers and opium 
farmers when individuals are not vulnerable to socio-economic conditions. This method 
also highlights the importance of legitimizing institutions and assisting the poor, which is 
the main objective of intervening in Afghanistan. While there are numerous challenges 
that must be addressed, increased economic markets and social services has the potential 
to expand community networks and make central governance more accountable in its 
actions. This type of reconstruction can be done in a non-confrontational way, and 
requires a more participatory role from locals to complement donor assistance. 
Empowering locals to become active in their community is the best way through which to 
break addiction—if residents feel they have control to change their future, reform is more 
likely to happen. 
B. MOVING FORWARD- HOW TO TACKLE THE DRUG TRADE 
THROUGH ADDICTION 
Since Afghanistan is constantly changing in terms of stability, there should be an 
action plan when developing social services and economic markets. As shown in the case 
studies, each province needs an individual assessment to ensure the infrastructure set up 
is sustainable. The following questions should be considered when moving forward: Are 
socio-economic opportunities broad enough to combat the tightly aligned drug network? 
Is expanding these opportunities feasible? How would this affect the role of counter 
narcotics? Are there potential negative implications that could emerge from tackling the 
drug trade differently?  
Expanding socio-economic opportunities is enough to fix the drug trade dilemma. 
As mentioned in the literature review, U.S.-led and UN-led counter narcotic strategies 
must be done concurrently to ensure regional stability. Corruption cannot be improved 
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and drug treatment policies cannot be implemented without stronger law enforcement. 
This was reinforced in the case studies as well as the report regarding negative attitudes 
towards government—social service projects were only effective in improving 
community perceptions in “regions with moderate levels of initial violence.”208 
Moreover, the drug treatment, security/governance, and economic components can 
sometimes mask each other’s strengths and weaknesses, opening the possibility of 
creating a more integrated approach to development. Programs aimed at countering 
narcotics are necessary for the security and stability of a province; without such efforts, 
economic infrastructure cannot survive. Building socio-economic infrastructure will, in 
turn, begin to close the poverty gap, which is one of the repercussions of eradication and 
interdiction methods. Infrastructure investments will also promote collective action 
within the community, prioritize individual access to political and economic 
opportunities, and enhance attention by the central government.  
While the integration of socio-economic and counter narcotic procedures is a 
better option than the status quo, some may wonder about feasibility. All three provinces 
studied here lacked the resources and capabilities necessary to developing infrastructure. 
This thesis also showed that Afghanistan’s health networks were completely dependent 
on foreign aid. While the international community has agreed to continue giving funds 
after troops deploy, it is unclear in how they are going to hand over responsibility to 
central government as time progresses. If central government does not take ownership 
and prioritize both the socio-economic and counter-narcotic dimensions of intervention, 
neither will be effective. 
Although there are financial gaps that must be addressed; some of the concerns 
will be improved by connecting these two elements of a coordinated approach, so that 
information is transparent and systems are more efficient. In addition, stronger 
communication networks and improved clinical governance would ensure more 
accountability and participation from key players. Currently, funding is prioritized to 
high risk regions like Kabul, Kandahar, and Badakhshan. A few of the traits that define a 
                                                 
208 Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds Through Development,” 2. 
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high risk province are proximity to the border, high population density, and involvement 
in the drug trafficking trade. If the two approaches are connected, they may be able to 
reach more at-risk regions. To understand how financial gaps would be addressed and 
how resources would be allocated in the future, further research needs to done on donor 
expectations.  
Lastly, there is concern that development would produce a domino effect, 
meaning that the drug trade would just transfer to a new location if it was unable to 
recruit the impoverished in the current locations. This is a concern, because the drug 
industry has relocated in the past. Yet drug treatment and counter narcotic programs 
should continue to be developed, because it is the international community’s 
responsibility to protect citizens from insurgent groups as well as enforce illicit drug 
trafficking. While legalization is the other answer, it is currently impractical since the 
initiative would require global consensus.  
The more problematic insight in regards to the domino effect came from the case 
studies, when there was a shift in opium cultivation in Badakhshan. Some residents saw 
involvement in the drug trade as a means to gather more donor funds. The global 
community does not want to incentivize bad behavior nor push a country to change its 
socio-economic structure without being fully equipped or willing to do so. If a province 
is unprepared, socio-economic developments could have the opposite effect and weaken 
efforts from the international community. The international community is aware of this 
backlash and has created programs to incentivize good behavior in more stable provinces. 
Simultaneously doing counter narcotic policies and socio-economic initiatives should 
alleviate some of these concerns. Stronger local relationships should prevent cases like 
these from happening; there would be a local outlet which residents could suggest such 
concerns.  
While this is a different route towards tackling poverty, connecting past 
approaches and emphasizing drug addiction seems like the best option. Instead of re-
inventing the wheel, scholars and regional experts can enrich methods that have already 
been implemented in the past. Psychological initiatives will need to be restructured to 
ensure that the strongest institutions are connected with the drug trafficking, 
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governance/security, and economic dimensions of intervention. Instead of putting more 
funds to new programs, these ideas suggest that development officers focus on efficiency 
and sustainability, with attention to monitoring and evaluation helping to produce better 
results. This thesis has represented one attempt to bring granular evidence to bear in 
drawing the links across the economic, sociopolitical, and psychological levels at play in 
building more successful drug treatment programs in Afghanistan.  
 89 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Aasheim, Lisa L. “Motivational Interviewing.” In Foundations of Addictions Counseling, 
by David Capuzzi and Mark Stauffer, 125–142. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Pearson Education, Inc, 2012. 
Abadi, Melissa H, et al. “Examining Human Rights and Mental Health Among Women in 
Drug Abuse Treatment Centers in Afghanistan.” International Journal of 
Women’s Health (April 2012): 155–165. 
Allan, Nigel J.R. “Opium Production in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” In Dangerous 
Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, by 
Michael K Steinberg, Joeseph J Hobbs and Kent Mathewson, 133–152. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Amodeo, et al. “Evaluation Program Planning.” Barriers to Implementing Evidence-
Based Practices in Addiction Treatment Programs: Comparing Staff Reports on 
Motivational Interviewing, Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach, 
Assertive Community Treatment, and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 34, no. 4 
(2011): 382–389. 
Arnoldy, Ben. “Kabul ‘safer’ for kids than London or New York, says NATO.” The 
Christian Science Monitor (November 2010): 1–5. 
Arnson, Cynthia. “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate.” In Rethinking 
the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, by Cynthia 
Arnson and William Zartman, 1–22. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2005. 
August, Lynn, and Barbara Gianola. “Symptoms of War Trauma Induced Psychiatric 
Disorders: Southeast Asian Refugees and Vietnam Veterans.” International 
Migration Review (The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.) 21, no. 3 
(1987): 820–832. 
Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo. “Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the 
War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan.” International Affairs 84, no. 4 
(2008): 641–658. 
Bareth, Narayan. “Rajasthan Farmers Face Opium Ban.” BBC News. October 23, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6076764.stm (accessed November 30, 
2011). 
Barnett, Rubin. “Saving Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 57–74, 76–78. 
 90 
Bazant, Wayne. Emerging Practices for the Treatment and Prevention of Drug 
Dependence in Afghanistan: Integrated Drug Prevention, Treatment and 
Rehabiliation Project in Afghanistan . Afghanistan: GTZ International Services, 
2006. 
Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. Winning Hearts and Minds 
through Development? Evidence from A Field Experiment in Afghanistan. 
Working Paper No. 2011–14, Massachusetts : Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, July 2012. 
Beehner, Lionel. “Afghanistan’s Role in Iran’s Drug Problem.” Council on Foreign 
Relations website. September 16, 2006. http://www.cfr.org/iran/afghanistans-role-
irans-drug-problem/p11457 (accessed August 27, 2011). 
Benderly, Beryl Lieff. “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Mental Health System.” SAMHSA 14, 
no. 1 (Janurary/February 2006): 1–4. 
Blanchard, Christopher M. Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2007. 
Byrd, William, and Christopher Ward. “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan.” Social 
Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, no. 18 (2004): 1–
25. 
Campbell, Howard. Drug War Zone: Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso 
and Juarez. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009. 
Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan. “Women & Mental Health in 
Afghanistan.” Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan website. n.d. 
http://www.cw4wafghan.ca/MentalHealth (accessed August 4, 2012). 
Cavukk, Sue, and M Sohail. “Increasing Strategic Accountability: A Framework for 
International NGOs.” Development in Practice 17, no. 2 (April 2007): 231–248. 
Chawla, Sandeep. The World Drug Report 2011. Annual Report, New York: United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2011. 
Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. Opium: Undercovering the Politics of the Poppy. London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co., 2009. 
Clemens, Jeffrey. “Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source Country 
Drug Control Policies.” Journal of Law and Economics (The University of 
Chicago Press) 51, no. 3 (August 2008): pp. 407–432. 
 
 91 
CNN Wire Staff. “Report: Afghan drug addiction twice global average.” CNN World 
News. June 23, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010–06–
23/world/afghanistan.drugs.report_1_opium-drug-users-poppy-
fields?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed November 10, 2011). 
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
Feasibility and Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers (Oxford University Press) 
61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27. 
The Colombo Plan. “Counselling Training for SSAWO Staff.” The Colombo Plan 
website. May 18, 2011. http://www.colombo-plan.org/index.php/counselling-
training-for-ssawo-staff/ (accessed August 5, 2012). 
Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and. 
Summary of District Development Plan: Tushkan District, Badakhshan Province. 
Summary Report, Kabul: MOPH, November 2008. 
D’Monte, Darryl. “Corruption, Safety and Environmental Hazard in Asian Societies.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 33 (August 2000): pp. 2959–2968. 
Duncan, Don. “How an Afghan Methadone Clinic is Fighting to Counter HIV/AIDS.” 
PRI’s The World. June 8, 2011. http://www.theworld.org/2011/06/how-an-
afghan-methadone-clinic- is- fighting-to-counter-hiv/ (accessed August 31, 2011). 
Dupee, Mathew. “Iran’s 30-Year War on Drugs.” World Politics Review, (2010): 1–2. 
Easterly, William. “The Big Push Déjà Vu: A Review of Jeffrey Sachs’s “The End of 
Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time.” Journal of Economic Literature 
44, no. 1 (March 2006): 96–105. 
Embassy of the United States. “PDAS Nichols Visits Drug Treatment Center in Kabul.” 
Embassy of the United States: Kabul Afghanistan website. September 16, 2012. 
http://kabul.usembassy.gov/nichols-visits.html (accessed October 15, 2012). 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Kicking the Opium Habit?: Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and 
Politics Since the 1980s.” Conflict, Security, & Development, (2006): 127–149. 
———. Shooting up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
Ferris-Rotman, Amie. “Lifting the Veil Off Afghanistan’s Female Addicts” FirstPost 
World website. April 1, 2012. http://www.firstpost.com/world/lifting-the-veil-off-
afghanistans-female-addicts-262403.html (accessed August 7, 2012). 
Forsberg, Carl. Politics and Power in Kandahar. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study 
of War, 2010. 
 92 
Gabriel, Roger, and Leigh Neal. “Lesson Of The Week: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Following Military Combat Or Peace Keeping.” British Medical Journal 324, no. 
7333 (2002): 340–341. 
Gavrilis, George. “The Good and Bad News About Afghan Opium.” Council on Foreign 
Relations website. 10 February, 2010. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/good-bad-
news-afghan-opium/p21372 (accessed August 27, 2011). 
Ghufran, Nasreen. “Afghanistan in 2006: The Complications of Post-Conflict 
Transition.” Asia Survey 47, no. 1 (January/February 2007): 87–98. 
Glaze, John. “Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy.” 
Strategic Studies Institute website. October 2007. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB804.pdf (accessed 
August 29, 2011). 
Goldberger, Bruce, David Martin, and and Gold Mark. Opium Smoke: The Study of 
Second- and Third-Hand Exposure in Women and Children of Afghanistan. Brief 
Technical Report, Folsom: NES, 2011. 
Gomart, Emilie. “Methadone: Six Effects in Search of a Substance.” Social Studies of 
Science 32, no. 1 (2002): 93–135. 
Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corruption or Conslidating the Peace? The Drug Economy and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 
3 (2008): 405–423. 
———. “Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in 
Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 837–859. 
———. “From War Economy to Peace Economy: Reconstruction and State Building in 
Afghanistan.” Journal of International Affairs 58 (2004): 155–174. 
Gopal, Anand. The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar. 
Washington, DC: New America Foundation, November 2010. 
Gordis, E. “Linking Research With Practice: Common Bonds, Common Progress.” 
Alcohol, Health and Research World 15, no. 3 (1991): 173–174. 
Grace, Jo, and Adam Pain. Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghan 
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2004. 
Gregg, Robert. “The United Nations and the Opium Problem.” The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 13, no. 1 (January 1964): 96–115. 
Grinnell, Erin, and Heloise Troc. Kabul Vulnerability Mapping. Surveillance Report, 
Afghanistan: Action Contre La Faim, 2004. 
 93 
Hansen, Cole; Dennys, Christian; and Zaman, Idrees . Conflict analysis: Baharak district, 
Badakhshan province. Provincial Report, Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and 
Unity, 2009. 
Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “Tackling Mental Health Problems in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles 
Times. May 15, 2011. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/15/world/la-fg-
afghanistan-therapy-20110515 (accessed October 20, 2012). 
Hepner, et al. “Training Addiction Counselors to Implement CBT for Depression.” 
Administrative POlicy Mental Health 38, no. 4 (2011): 313–323. 
“Heroin Labs Harm Locals.” Sada-e Azado. September 28, 2012. http://sada-e-
azadi.net/Joomla/index.php/en/topics/features/6844-heroin- labs-harm-locals 
(accessed August 10, 2010). 
Howtay, Brian. “2nd Training of Afghan Trainers on Ethics For Addiction 
Professionals.” The Colombo Plan website. May 31, 2012. http://www.colombo-
plan.org/index.php/2nd-training-of-afghan-trainers-on-ethics- for-addiction-
professionals/ (accessed July 25, 2012). 
Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. “Demobilization and Reintegration.” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2007): 531–567 . 
IEEE Global History Network. “Electricity Supply in Afghanistan.” 2012. 
http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/Electricity_Supply_in_Afghanistan 
(accessed November 1, 2012). 
International Medical Corps . “A Ground-breaking Move for Mental Health Services in 
Kabul, Afghanistan.” International Medical Corps website. 2012. 
http://internationalmedicalcorps.org/jangalak-substance-misuse-center (accessed 
August 5, 2012). 
———. “Afghanistan: Mental Health and Substance Misuse.” International Medical 
Corps website. 2012. http://internationalmedicalcorps.org/page.aspx?pid=2273 
(accessed August 15, 2012). 
———. “International Medical Corps Launches Program in Afghanistan to Combat High 
Levels of Mental Illness, Substance Abuse.” International Medical Corps website. 
February 23, 2011. http://internationalmedicalcorps.org/page.aspx?pid=1956 
(accessed August 5, 2012). 
International Narcotics Control Board. “Current Supply of Legal Opium Adequate to 
Meet World Demand, Says INCB President.” International Narcotics Control 
Board website. November 12, 2007. 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/press_release_2007–11–12_01.html (accessed 
October 25, 2011). 
 94 
IRIN. “Afghanistan: Opium Abuse Harming Women’s, Children’s Health.” IRIN 
website. May 29, 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=72419 
(accessed October 1, 2012). 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MCN. National Drug Demand Reduction Policy 2012–
2016. Policy Report, Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MCN, 2012. 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Economy, Austrailan Government, and 
World Bank. Afghanistan Provincial Briefs. Joint Report, Kabul: Ministry of 
Economy and the World Bank, June 2011. 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH. Afghanistan National Health Accounts 2008–
2009. Financial Report, Kabul: USAID, April 2011. 
———. Director General of Preventative and Primary Health Care Communicable 
Disease Directorate. Country Progress Report, Kabul: Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan MOPH, March 30 2012. 
———. Final: Policy on Opioid Substitution Therapy. Kabul: MOPH, February 2009. 
———. List of Active Health Facilities by Province in 2009. April 13, 2009. 
http://www.moph.gov.af/ (accessed August 15, 2012). 
———. “Ministry Of Public Health Enhances Health Services To Inject Drug Users.” 
MOPH Islamic Republic of Afghanistan website. August 7, 2008. 
http://moph.gov.af/en/news/286 (accessed October 5, 2012). 
———. Professional Package for Medical Doctors for Mental Health Working in the 
BPHS in Afghanistan. Kabul: Mental Health Department of the MOPH, 2008. 
Kabul University. Psychology. n.d. http://ku.edu.af/en/page/884 (accessed October 1, 
2012). 
Kantor, Paula, and Adam Pain. Rethinking Rural Poverty Reduction in Afghanistan. 
Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2011. 
Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. CRS 
Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
Kirby, Kimberley, Lois Benishek, Karen Leggett Dugosha, and Kerwin MaryLouise. 
“Substance abuse treatment providers’ beliefs and objections regarding 
contingency management: Implications for dissemination.” Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence 85 (2006): 19–27. 
LaMond, Tullis F. Handbookd of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffick: Socioeconomic 
and Political Consequences. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991. 
 95 
Landler, Mark. “Envoy Says Corruption Helps Taliban Win Recruits.” The New York 
Times. July 28, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/world/asia/29diplo.html?_r=1 (accessed 
August 5, 2012). 
Larance, Briony, et al. “The Availability, Diversion, and Injection of Pharmaceutical 
Opiods in South Asia.” Drug and Alcohol Review, (May 2011): 246–254. 
Laudet, Alexandre B. “The Road to Recovery: Where are we going and how do we get 
there? Empirically-driven conclusions and future directions for service 
development and research.” Substance Use Misuse 43, no. 12–13 (2008): 2001–
2020. 
Looney, Robert. “Trends: Afghanistan Strung Out.” The Milken Institute Review (April 
2009): 8–15. 
MacDonald, Dave, and David Mansfield. “Drugs and Afghanistan.” Drugs: Education, 
Prevention and Policy 8, no. 1 (2001): 1–6. 
Macdonald, David. Afghanistan’s Hidden Drug Problem: The Misuse of Psychotropics. 
Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2008. 
———. Drug Use in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws, and Scorpion Tales. London: Pluto 
Press, 2007. 
MacDonald, Scott, and Bruce Zagaris. International Handbook on Drug Control. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992. 
Maguet, Olivier, and Murtaza Majeed. “Implementing Harm Reduction for Heroin Users 
in Afghanistan, the Worldwide Opium Supplier.” International Journal of Drug 
Policy 21, no. 2 (2010): 119–121. 
Mansfield, David. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Counternarcotic Efforts and their 
Effects in Nangarhar and Helmand in the 2010–11 Growing Season. Research 
Report, Afghanistan Research and Evalution Unit, 2011. 
Mansfield, David, and Jonathan Goodhand. Drugs and Disorder: A Study of the Opium 
Economy, Political Settlements and State-building in Afghanistan. Working 
paper, UKaid, Destin Development Studies Institute and Crisis States Research 
Centre, 2010. 
Marinelli-Casey, Patricia, Catherine Domier, and Richard Rawson. “The Gap Between 
Research and Practice in Substance Abuse Treatment.” Psychiatric Services 
(2002): 984–987.  
 
 96 
Marshall, Karla. “Corps of Engineers to Improve Access to Water, Power in Southern 
Afghanistan.” U.S. Army website. June 25, 2012. 
http://www.army.mil/article/82432/Corps_of_Engineers_to_improve_access_to_
water__power_in_southern_Afghanistan/ (accessed August 15, 2012). 
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Annex D: 
Support to Provincial Governance: Provincial Needs Assessment Badakhshan. 
Provincial Needs Assessment, Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law, 2009. 
McCoy, Alfred. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. 
Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003. 
Mental Health & DDR Department, MOPH. National Mental Health Strategy 2009–
2014. Policy Report, Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan MOPH, 2009. 
Miller, William R, P.L Wilbourne, and J.E. Hettema. “What Works? A Summary of 
Alcohol Treatment Outcom Research.” In Handbook of Alcoholism Treatment 
Approaches , by Reid K Hester and William R Miller, 13–63. Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 2003. 
Mojumdar, Aunohita. “In Afghanistan, Drug Rehab for Children.” The Christian Science 
Monitor. (July 14, 2010). http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-
Central/In-Afghanistan-drug-rehab-for-children (accessed August 20, 2011). 
MOPH and MCN with Ministry of Justice, NGOs, and International Experts. Conference 
on Opioid Substitution Therapy: An Essential Service in Harm Reduction in 
Afghanistan. Conference Report, Kabul: MOPH, March 2008. 
Mora, Frank O. “Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking and U.S. Policy in 
Brazil and the Southern Cone of Latin America.” The Journal of Social, Political, 
and Economic Studies 21, no. 2 (1996): 115–140. 
Morikawa, MJ, S Schneider, S Becker, and Lipovac S. “Primary Care in Post-Conflict 
Rural Northern Afghanistan.” Public Health 125, no. 1 (January 2011): 55–59. 
Nadelmann, Ethan. “Drugs.” Foreign Policy, no. 162 (September-October 2007): 24–30. 
National AIDS Control Program (NACP). Integrated Behavioral and Biological 
Surveillance (IBBS) in Afghanistan: Year 1 Report . Surveillance Report, Kabul: 
Ministry of Public Health, 2010. 
National AIDS Control Program, MOPH. 2010 National Composite Policy Index (NCPI) 
Report: Afghanistan. Index Report, Kabul: UNAIDS, 2010. 
Nelkin, Dorothy. Methadone Maintenance: A Technological Fix. New York: Braziller, 
George Inc., 1973. 
 97 
Newberg, Paula. “Surviving State Failure: Internal War and Regional Conflict in 
Afghanistan’s Neighborhood.” In Rethinking the Economics of War: The 
Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, by Cynthia Arnson and William 
Zartman, 206–233. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
———. “Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.” Yale Global Online. March 7, 
2005. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/drug-free-afghanistan-not-so-easy 
(accessed November 20, 2011). 
Nijhowne, Diya; Oates, Lauren. Living with Violence: A National Report on Domestic 
Abuse in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Global Rights: Partners for Justice, 
March 2008. 
Nordland, Rod. “Sign of Afghan Addiction May Also Be its Remedy.” The New York 
Times. 16 May, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/asia/17afghan.html?_r=1& (accessed 
August 5, 2012). 
Open Source Center. “Selection List: Afghanistan Press 27 Aug 11.” Open Source 
Center. August 27, 2011. 
http:www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121
123_43/content/Display/SAP20110827950026 (accessed August 31, 2011). 
Osborn, Cynthia. “Psychotherapeutic Approaches.” In Foundations of Addictions 
Counseling, by David Capuzzi and Mark Stauffer, 142–161. Upper Saddle River, 
New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc, 2012. 
Özerdem, Alpaslan. “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former 
Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective.” 
Third World Quarterly (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 23, no. 5 (2002): 961–975. 
Pain, Adam. Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and 
Badakhshan Provinces. Case Study Series, Kabul: Afghan Research and 
Evaluation Unit, June 2011. 
Palau, Rainer Gonzalez. “Drug Abuse & Treatment Facilities in Afghanistan.” Civil-
Military Fusion Centre: Afghanistan in Transition (March 2012): 1–8. 
Paoli, Letizia. The World Heroin Market: Can Supply be cut? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
Peters, Gretchen. Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
New York: St. Martins Press, 2009. 
 
 98 
Pierre-Arnaud, Chouvy. “Taliban’s Drug Dilemma: Opium Production vs. International 
Recognition.” Geopium website. December 8, 1999. 
http://geopium.org/125/talibans-drug-dilemma-opium-production-vs-
international-recognition (accessed August 20, 2012). 
The PRI’s World. “How an Afghan Methadone Clinic is Fighting to Counter HIV.” The 
PRI’s World. 8 June, 2011. http://www.theworld.org/2011/06/how-an-afghan-
methadone-clinic- is- fighting-to-counter-hiv/ (accessed November 15, 2011). 
Rawson, Richard. Building an Addiction Workforce in the Middle East: A counselor 
Training Program Partnership Between Kasr Al-Ainy and UCLA. Washington, 
D.C.: Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Public Health in the Middle East, 2011. 
Refworld. How Will Badakhshan Recover from Violence? RCA Issue 681, Washington, 
DC: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 2012. 
Relief Web. “Afghanistan Weekly Update No. 383.” Reliefweb website. October 10, 
2000. http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-weekly-update-no-383 
(accessed October 30, 2012). 
———. “Afghanistan: Despite counter-narcotics efforts, number of drug addicts still 
high in Kandahar .” Relief Web website. June 27, 2012. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/despite-counter-narcotics-efforts-number-
drug-addicts-still-high-kandahar (accessed August 5, 2012). 
Resnicow, Ken, and McMaster Fiona. “Motivational Interviewing: Moving from Why to 
How with Autonomy Support.” International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and 
Physical Activity 9, no. 19 (2012): 1–9. 
Rosenberg, Mathew. “‘Malign’ Afghans Targeted.” Wall Street Journal. December 29, 
2012. http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052970203513204576047734260414722.html (accessed August 10, 
2012). 
Rubin, Alissa J. “Few Treatment Options for Afghans as Drug Use Rises.” New York 
Times. August 27, 2011. http://nytimes.com/2011/08/28/world/asia 
/28kabul.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss (accessed August 27, 
2011). 
Sachs, Jeffrey. The end of poverty: Economic possibilities for our time. New York: 
Penguin Press, 2005. 
Sands, Chris. “Population Growth Overwhelms Kabul.” The National, August 30, 2008: 
1. 
Schweich, Thomas. U.S. Counter Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. Country report, 
U.S. State Department, August 2007. 
 99 
Shukla, Paraag. Battlefield Update: Task Force dreadnaught in Maiwand District, 
Kandahar. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, January 23, 2012. 
Simpson, Dwayne, and George Joe. “A Longitudinal Evaluation of Treatment 
Engagement and Recovery Stages.” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 
(2004): 89–97. 
Smye, Victoria, Annette Browne, Colleen Varcoe, and Josewski. “Harm Reduction, 
Methadone Maintenance Treatment and the Root Causes of Health and Social 
Inequities: An Intersectional Lens in the Canadian Context.” Harm Reduction 
Journal (2011): 1–12. 
South Asia Human Development Sector. Mapping and Situation Assessment of Key 
Populations at High Risk of HIV in Three Cities of Afghanistan. Report Number 
23, The World Bank, April 2008. 
Spiller, Henry, Douglas Lorenz, Elise Bailey, and Richard Dart. “Epidemiological Trends 
in Abuse and Misuse of Prescription Opioids.” Journal of Addictive Diseases 28, 
no. 2 (2009): 130–136. 
Stanekzai, MR, et al. “Baseline Assessment of Community Knowledge and Attitudes 
Toward Drug Use and Harm Reduction in Kabul, Afghanistan.” Drug Alcohol 
Review 31, no. 4 (2012): 451–460. 
Stanikzai, Mohammad. “Afghanistan.” UNODC website. n.d. 
www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/CoPro/Web_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed August 
2012, 27). 
Starkey, Jerome. “How UK Junkie Cash Will Kill Our Boys.” The Sun. April 29, 2008. 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/1101163/News
-Our-Boys-Forces-How-UK-junkie-cash-will-kill-Our-Boys.html (accessed 15 
August, 2012). 
Stimson Center. “Iran’s Response to Drugs from Afghanistan.” Stimson Center website. 
January 28, 2011. http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/irans-response-to-drugs-from-
afghanistan/ (accessed November 19, 2011). 
Stracansky, Pavol. “Afghanistan: New Therapy Battles Soaring Drug Addiction.” Inter 
Press Service News Agency. April 5, 2011. http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/04 
/afghanistan-new-therapy-battles-soaring-drug-addiction/ (accessed October 1, 
2012). 
Sullivan-Owomoyela, Joan, and Laura Brannelly. Promoting Participation: Community 
Contributions to Education in Conflict Situations. Reading, UK: UNESCO, 2009. 
Svennson, Jakob. “Eight Questions about Corruption.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19, no. 3 (2005): 19–42. 
 100 
Todd, Catherine, Abdullah Abed, Paul Scott, Naqibullah Safi, Kenneth Earhart, and 
Steffanie Strathdee. “A Cross-Sectional Assessment of Utilization of Addiction 
Treatment Among Injection Users in Kabul, Afghanistan.” Substance Use and 
Misuse (2009): 416–430. 
Todd, Catherine, Mark Stibich, Raza Stanekzai, Zafar Rasuli, Shairshah Bayan, and 
Saifur, Strathdee, Steffanie Wardak. “A Qualitative Assessment of Injection Drug 
Use and Harm Reduction Programs in Kabul, Afghanistan: 2006–2007.” 
International Journal of Drug Policy (2009): 111–120. 
Todd, Catherine; Naqibullah, Safi; and Strathdee, Steffanie. “Drug use and harm 
reduction in Afghanistan.” Harm Reduction Journal 2, no. 13 (2005): 1–6. 
Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Health. A Basic Package of 
Health Services for Afghanistan. Yearly Report, Kabul: MOPH, 2010. 
Trotman, Adria J, and Faye S Taxman. “Implementation of a Contingency Management-
Based Intervention in a Community Supervision Setting: Clinical Issues and 
Recommendations.” J Offender Rehabilitation 50, no. 5 (2011): 235–251. 
Tullis, LaMond. Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic- Socioeconomic and 
Political Consequences. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991. 
Tushkan District Development Assembly with the facilitation of NABDP/MRRD and 
support of the District and Provincial Governors. Summary of District 
Development Plan: Tushkan District, Badakhshan Province. Development Plan, 
Badakhshan: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 
and Development, November 2008. 
U.S. Department of State. “Demand Reduction Program: Afghanistan.” May 13, 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/141848.htm (accessed August 18, 2011). 
———. “Update on Counternarcotics in Afghanistan: August 2008 United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime Poppy Cultivation Survey.” August 2008. 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/State/109051.pdf (accessed August 
18, 2012). 
U.S. GAO. “Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but 
Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation Justice Reform Efforts Needed.” 
Report to Congressional Addressees, 2010. 
U.S. GAO. “Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan.” Congressional 
Report, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. “Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and 
Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability.” Report to 
Congressional Requestors, Washington, DC, 2003. 
 101 
U.S. State Department. 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). 
Country Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, March 2012. 
———. “State Department on Counternarcotics Programs in Afghanistan.” IIP Digital: 
United States of America Embassy website. May 04, 2012. 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/05/201205045117.html?
CP.rss=true#axzz23wAlKkda (accessed August 18, 2012). 
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office Report. Country Report, London: Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 2011. 
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. “Despite Counter-Narcotics Efforts, Number of 
Drug Addicts Still High in Kandahar.” UNAMA website. June 27, 2012. 
http://mpwiis07-
beta02.dfs.un.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1783&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=17
171 (accessed August 5, 2012). 
UN Millennium Campaign. “End Poverty 2015 Millennium Campaign.” n.d. 
http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/goals (accessed November 30, 2011). 
UNDP/UNOPS. “List of Institiutions and Organizations Working in the Field of 
Disability in Afghanistan.” MOPH website. August 10, 2004. 
http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ngo_dpo_afghanistan_04.pd
f (accessed August 5, 2012). 
UNHCR. “Afghan Returns Pass 50,000 in First Eight Months, Up on Last Year.” The UN 
Refugee Agency website. August 30, 2012. http://www.unhcr.org/503f63f66.html 
(accessed September 5, 2012). 
UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. “Conflict- Induced Internally Displaced Persons in 
Afghanistan.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website. July 2012. 
http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/81604190AD126D1
1C125785200620C06?OpenDocument (accessed September 8, 2012). 
UNODC. Afghanistan: Implementing Alternatives to Imprisonment, in line with 
International Standards and National Legislation. Assessment Report, New York: 
United Nations, May 2008. 
———. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment for the Central, 
Eastern, Southern and Western Regions. Rapid Assessment, Kabul: UNODC and 
MCN, January 2011. 
———. Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan:Time Frame: June 2010 – July 2012. 
Concept Note, UNODC, April 2010. 
 102 
———. “Drug Demand Reduction and HIV/AIDS.” United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime website. 2011. http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/drug-demand-
reduction-and-hiv-aids.html (accessed November 28, 2011).  
———. Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey. Executive Summary, United Kingdom: 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009. 
———. Drug Use Survey 2010: Sarpoza Prison, Kandahar, Afghanistan. Kandahar: 
UNODC, June 2010. 
———. “Life in the Mountains of Badakhshan: The Burden of Past Opium 
Dependence .” UNODC website. September 5, 2010. 
http://www.wadan.org/drug.asp?CatID=9&ContID=100 (accessed October 1, 
2010). 
———. Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat 
Assessment. UNODC, May 2012. 
———. Reducing Drug Demand and HIV in Afghanistan, Time Frame: June 2010 – July 
2012. Concept Note, UNODC, 2010. 
———. “UNODC brings Medical Care to Prison in Kandahar.” October 10, 2010. 
http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/en/unodcmedicalcare.html (accessed August 
20, 2012). 
———. “UNODC Chief Visits Northern Afghan Province of Badakhshan.” UNODC 
website. May 31, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/May/unodc-chief-visits-northern-
afghan-province-of-badakhshan.html (accessed August 10, 2012). 
———. “UNODC Chief Visits Transition House for Women Leaving Prison in Kabul.” 
UNODC website. May 30, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/May/unodc-chief-visits-
transition-house-for-women-leaving-prison- in-kabul.html (accessed August 10, 
2012). 
UNODC and WHO. “Principles of Drug Dependence Treatment.” United Nations Office 
of Drugs and Crime website. March 2008. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-treatment/UNODC-WHO-Principles-of-
Drug-Dependence-Treatment-March08.pdf (accessed August 15, 2011). 
UNODC Statistics and Surveys Section. Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported 
by the Victims. Study, Kabul: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2010 




on_Practice (accessed August 1, 2012). 
Vaziri, Haleh, and Sonja Gloeckle. HIV and AIDS Awareness and Knowledge in 
Afghanistan. Survey Results Report, Washington, D.C.: InterMedia, April 2008. 
WADAN. “Drug Control: Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Center in Badakhshan 
Province .” WADAN website. n.d. 
http://www.wadan.org/drug.asp?CatID=9&ContID=100 (accessed October 5, 
2012). 
———. “Drug Control: Jangalak Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Center in Kabul 
City.” WADAN website. n.d. 
http://www.wadan.org/drug.asp?CatID=9&ContID=101 (accessed August 1, 
2012). 
———. “Drug Control.” WADAN website. n.d. 
http://www.wadan.org/drug.asp?CatID=9&ContID=103 (accessed August 20, 
2012). 
Walters, ST, SA MatMatson, JS Baer, and DM Ziedonis. “Effectiveness of Workshop 
Training for Psychosocial Addiction Treatments: A Systematic Review.” Journal 
of Substance Abuse Treatment 29, no. 4 (2005): 283–293. 
Weisman, Thomas. Drug Abuse and Drug Counseling. New York: National Library of 
Medicine, 1974. 
Westra, Henny, Adi Aviram, and Faye Doell. “Extending Motivational Interviewing to 
the Treatment of Major Mental Health Problems: Current Directions and 
Evidence.” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 56, no. 11 (2011): 643–650. 
Whittenburg, Scott R. Opium in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned From the Counterdrug 
Strategies of Columbia. Thesis, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 
WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF. Global HIV/AIDS Response: Epidemic Update and 
Health Sector Progress towards Universal Access. Progress Report, Geneva: 
WHO, 2011. 
WHO-AIMS. Mental Health System in Afghanistan. Yearly Report, Kabul: WHO and 
MOPH, 2006. 
Wilson, Jeremy. “Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the 
Reconstruction of Kosovo’s Police and Justice Systems.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (2006): 152–177. 
 104 
Woodcock, Sophia. Socio-Economic and Psychological Assessment of fluctuation and 
Variations of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Key Provinces in Afghanistan: Balkh, 
Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Central Provinces. Kabul: UNODC, 2006. 
The World Food Programme. “Provincial Profile.” The World Food Programme website. 
2007. http://www.foodsecurityatlas.org/afg/country/provincial-Profile (accessed 
August 05, 2012). 
Wyler, Liana. International Drug Control Policy. U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
2009. 
Zaric, Gregory, Margaret Brandeau, and Barnett. “Methadone Maintenance and HIV 
Prevention” A Cost Effective Analysis.” Management Science 46, no. 8 (August 
2000): 1013–1031. 
Zyck, Steven. “Opium Poppies & the Afghan Economy.” Civil Military Fusion Centre: 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Ajmal Sabawoon 
 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, JHSPH 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
4. Enda Egan 
 Afghanistan Country Office, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
5. David Macdonald 
 International Drugs and Development Advisor, DSM Ltd 
 Perth, United Kingdom 
 
6. Hamid Folad 
 Drug Demand Reduction Program, MOPH 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
7. Khalid Sharifi 
 Social and Health Development Program (SHDP) 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
8.  Dr. Sajid Azam 
 National AIDS Control Program, MOPH 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
9. Omarzaman Sayedi 
 Health Policy Project (HPP), MPH 
 Kabul, Afghanistan 
 
 
